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JUDICIAL INNOVATION UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND BILL 
OF RIGHTS ACT - LESSONS FOR QUEENSLAND?  
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I   INTRODUCTION 
In June 2016, the Legal Affairs and Community Safety Committee of 
Queensland’s Parliament issued a split report on its ‘Inquiry into a possible Human 
Rights Act for Queensland’.1 Division occurred along largely predictable party lines: 
Government members of the Committee recommended that such a measure be 
legislated into existence;2 Opposition members decried it as unnecessary and likely to 
be harmful. The inquiry’s genesis in a post-election deal permitting a minority Labor 
Party Government to form meant a party line divide was not overly surprising. 
Underpinning these partisan positions, however, were differing accounts as to how 
such an instrument might come to be used in the courts. For the Opposition minority, 
the proposal threatens to transfer significant policy making powers away from elected 
politicians to the judiciary, leading them to approvingly quote from the submission of 
Professor James Allan: 
You either have a process where you count everyone equally and they vote for 
representatives who decide or you have a process where seven or nine top 
judges decide things by purporting to be moral experts or philosopher kings of 
some sense.3   
The Government majority was somewhat more sanguine, preferring the views of 
Professor George Williams: 
My view is that the courts do have a role, a complementary role; if you like, 
quite a weak role as compared to anything like the US Bill of Rights, for 
example. However, it is a complementary role that comes in after the human 
rights act has properly shaped debate within those more democratic 
institutions. If that happens, you do not need to get to the courts.4  
The disagreement between Committee members was thus at least in part based on 
competing predictions as to what Queensland courts would (or would not) do should 
such an instrument be enacted.  
Of course, predictions ultimately are empirical claims, and such claims may be 
assessed in the light of similar happenings elsewhere. Consequently, in the course of 
its deliberations the Committee looked5 at the operation of the New Zealand Bill of 
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Rights Act (‘NZBORA’),6 as well as to other jurisdictions that have adopted statutory 
rights instruments. This is not the first time that Australia has considered whether New 
Zealand’s experience might be relevant in a cross-Tasman context. 7  Indeed, the 
NZBORA already has been acknowledged8 as the template for the rights instruments 
adopted in both Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory. 9   Given this 
demonstrated interest, our purpose in this article is to provide for a Queensland 
audience an account of the NZBORA’s central features, how these came to be, what 
the instrument was thought likely to do, and the way that the judiciary has applied it 
since first entering into force. Our explanation is situated within New Zealand’s wider 
historical, political and legal framework. Noting Mark Tushnet’s warning that 
‘differences in constitutional cultures complicate the task of doing comparative 
constitutional law’,10  we supply the contextual background that will allow readers 
unfamiliar with New Zealand to draw meaningful lessons from its experiences. 11 
Furthermore, we think that the adoption and subsequent 26 year development of the 
NZBORA forms a unified story that requires telling in full. The instrument was 
enacted as the result of a watered-down political ‘compromise’12 after proposals for a 
stronger form, higher law Bill of Rights were rejected. This origin story then allows 
commentators to discern in the NZBORA what they want to see: either the seed of a 
powerful guarantor of individual rights requiring only a sprinkling of judicial boldness 
to bring it to flower; or a ‘window dressing’13 measure that was never meant to deliver 
any significant change at all.  
Our own view is that while neither of these polar versions of the NZBORA has 
been fully realised, the circumstances of the original legislative compromise 
nevertheless have continued to flow through the instrument’s subsequent history in 
ways that complicate any simple account of its application in practice. Although New 
Zealand does not have an established constitutional tradition of originalist 
interpretation in the vein of the United States, those charged with construing and 
applying the NZBORA have been, and continue to be, profoundly influenced by the 
6  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ). 
7  See, eg, Jerome B Elkind, ‘New Zealand’s Experience with a Non-Entrenched Bill of Rights’ in 
Phillip Alston, Towards an Australian Bill of Rights (Centre for International and Public Law, 
Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1994);  Julie Taylor, ‘Human Rights 
Protection in Australia – Interpretation Provisions and Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2004) 32 
Federal Law Review 57, 70-71; Simon Evans, ‘Improving Human Rights Analysis In The 
Legislative And Policy Processes’ (2005) 29 Melbourne University Law Review 665, 691-93; 
Suri Ratnapala, ‘Bills of Rights in Functioning Parliamentary Democracies: Kantian, 
Consequentialist And Institutionalist Scepticisms’ (2010) 34 Melbourne University Law Review 
592, 592-93. 
8  George Williams, ‘The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Origins and 
Scope’ (2006) 30 Melbourne University Law Review 880, 881.  
9  Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT); Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).  
10  Mark Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in 
Comparative Constitutional Law (Princeton University Press, 2009) 5. 
11  See Vicki C Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies’ in Mark Rosenfeld and 
András Sajó (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 54, 66-67. See also David Erdos, ‘Judicial Culture and the Politicolegal 
Opportunity Structure: Explaining Bill of Rights Legal Impact in New Zealand’ (2009) 34 Law 
and Society Inquiry 95, 96-97. 
12  See Claudia Geiringer, ‘What’s the Story?: The Instability of the Australasian Bills of Rights’ 
(2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 156, 170 (hereafter Geiringer, What’s the 
Story?) (Describing the NZBORA as ‘an unstable and under-explored compromise, erected on 
uncertain constitutional terrain’). 
13  (17 July 1990) 508 NZPD 2803, (RJS Munro). 
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conditions of its creation.14 This experience then provides a lesson for Queensland 
when deciding whether to adopt a NZBORA-like instrument: you cannot readily 
predict what you will get with such a measure because (1) its very purpose is open to 
different interpretations; and (2) it is not self-applying in that it requires considerable 
judicial interpretation and application.15 That interpretation and application may then 
vary markedly, depending on the subsequent judicial view of its purpose. So it is not so 
much that you cannot always get what you want when adopting a measure like the 
NZBORA, more that you do not always know what you will get.  
We explore these matters as follows. For readers unfamiliar with the NZBORA, 
we outline its central features in part 2. In part 3 we examine how it came to be 
enacted, noting that the original proposal was for a ‘higher law’ instrument that would 
permit judicial override of legislation. That proposal’s eventual political defeat and the 
subsequent adoption into law of a weaker, ‘ordinary law’ rights instrument created a 
deep uncertainty over what, if anything, this new measure was meant to do. This 
uncertainty was manifest in differing views as to how the judiciary should enforce the 
rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA. In part 4 we examine how active the 
courts have been in crafting and applying remedies for individuals whose guaranteed 
rights are breached. Our view is that judicial practice has varied over time in ways that 
reflect differing underlying assumptions about the NZBORA’s basic constitutional 
importance. We then conclude in part 5 with some comments on how New Zealand’s 
experience is relevant to Queensland’s decision whether to follow in its Antipodean 
cousin’s footsteps. 
II   THE NZBORA’S CENTRAL FEATURES 
The NZBORA is an ordinary enactment of the New Zealand parliament. It is not 
formally superior to any other legislation that body passes (or has passed) into law; indeed, as 
shall be seen, it occupies something of a conceptually inferior position vis-à-vis competing 
enactments. Furthermore, the NZBORA’s ordinary statute status permits a bare parliamentary 
majority to amend or repeal it. Despite this un-entrenched, ‘ordinary law’ status, however, the 
NZBORA’s preamble espouses lofty goals, stating that it is: 
An Act — 
(a) To affirm, protect, and promote human rights and fundamental
freedoms in New Zealand; and
(b) To affirm New Zealand’s commitment to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights. 16
It purports to do so by positively recognising a range of civil and political rights and 
freedoms,17 but not so-called ‘social and economic’ rights such as the right to an adequate 
14  See Paul Rishworth, ‘Reflections on the Bill of Rights After Quilter v Attorney-General’ [1998] 
New Zealand Law Review 683, 688-89 (hereafter Rishworth, ‘Reflections on the Bill of Rights’); 
Janet McLean, ‘The New Zealand Bill of Rights and Constitutional Propriety’ (2013) 11 New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 19, 21 (hereafter McLean, ‘The NZBORA and 
Constitutional Propriety’); Paul Rishworth, ‘The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights’ in 
Andrew Stockley & Michael Littlewood (eds), The New Zealand Supreme Court: The First Ten 
Years (LexisNexis, 2015) 169, 172 (hereafter Rishworth, ‘Supreme Court’); Geiringer, What’s 
the Story?, above n 12, 163-164. 
15  Richard Ekins, ‘Human Rights and the Separation of Powers’ (2015) 34 Queensland Law 
Journal 217, 224-228. 
16  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) preamble. 
17  Ibid ss 8–27. 
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standard of living, housing or health care. A duty to respect these guaranteed rights applies to 
the legislative, executive and judicial branches of government,18 as well as to any person or 
body acting ‘in the performance of any public function, power or duty imposed by law’. 19 
That duty’s precise nature depends upon the identity of the actor in question and the basis for 
its action. The NZBORA does not contain a higher law set of constitutional fundamentals that 
legally constrains the actions of all public actors. Rather, it provides a legislative guarantee of 
rights intended to authorise judicial restraints on public power in some circumstances, but 
allows political actors to determine the outcome to rights questions in others. 
Understanding just how the NZBORA strikes this balance requires recognition of New 
Zealand’s now unique constitutional commitment to a Diceyan concept of parliamentary 
sovereignty.20 That is to say, enactments of the New Zealand Parliament remain the nation’s 
highest form of law and no individual or other institution (including the nation’s courts) may 
invalidate or refuse to apply such legislation.21 From this Grundnorm proposition certain 
NZBORA consequences automatically proceed. Where the executive branch or some person 
or body performing a public function, power or duty acts in a way that limits one of the 
NZBORA guaranteed rights, and that limit cannot be ‘demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society’, 22  the action is prima facie unlawful due to inconsistency with a 
parliamentary enactment.23  In such cases the courts may intervene by way of applying 
standard administrative law remedies for unlawful public action.24 By the same token, the 
judiciary itself is bound to respect the rights contained in the NZBORA when carrying out its 
various functions, including (to a still contested extent) developing the common law.25 These 
aspects of the NZBORA’s application largely mirror other jurisdictions with entrenched, 
higher-law rights instruments in place.26  
The NZBORA differs from such instruments, however, in that it does not take 
precedence over any other legislation enacted by Parliament. An obvious question of priority 
then arises where a competing legislative provision apparently authorises, or even requires, a 
public actor to act in ways that unjustifiably limit the rights guaranteed by the NZBORA. The 
so-called ‘operative provisions’ contained in sections 4-6 provide the answer. Section 4 
explicitly precludes the courts invalidating or refusing to apply any other enactment—
18  Ibid s 3(a). 
19  Ibid s 3(b). See also Ransfield v The Radio Network [2005] 1 NZLR 233 (HC). 
20  Mark Tushnet, Advanced Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2014) 
41 (describing New Zealand as ‘the only [constitutional] system that remains committed in 
theory to parliamentary sovereignty’). 
21  See Andrew Geddis, ‘Parliamentary Government in New Zealand: Lines of Continuity and 
Moments of Change’ (2016) 14 International Journal of Constitutional Law 99, 101-102; 110 
(hereafter Geddis, ‘Parliamentary Government in New Zealand’).  
22  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 5. 
23  But see below n 27 and accompanying text. 
24  See, eg, Living Word Distributors v Human Rights Action Group [2000] 3 NZLR 570 (CA); 
Manga v Attorney General [2000] 2 NZLR 65 (HC), 126-133; Drew v Attorney General [2002] 
1 NZLR 58 (CA); Wilding v Attorney General [2003] 3 NZLR 787 (CA), 14; Television New 
Zealand Limited v Attorney-General 8 HRNZ 45 (2004) (CA); Schubert v Wanganui District 
Council [2011] NZAR 233 (HC); Ministry of Health v Atkinson [2012] NZCA 184, [2012] 3 
NZLR 456; New Zealand Motor Caravan Association Inc v Thames-Coromandel District 
Council [2014] NZHC 2016; Watson v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2015] 
NZHC 1227; Taylor v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2015] NZCA 477; B v 
Waitemata District Health Board [2016] NZCA 184. 
25  See Lange v Atkinson [1998] 3 NZLR 424 (CA); Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34, [2005] 1 
NZLR 1; Andrew Geddis, ‘The Horizontal Effects of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act as 
Applied in Hosking v Runting’ [2004] New Zealand Law Review 700.  
26  See Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth, ‘You Say You Want a Revolution? Bills of Rights in 
the Age of Human Rights’, in D Dyzenhaus, M Hunt, G Huscroft (eds), A Simple Common 
Lawyer: Essays in Honour of Michael Taggart (Hart Publishing, 2009) 123, 127-129.  
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regardless of when it was enacted—because of inconsistency with the instrument’s rights 
guarantees. For this reason the NZBORA may be described as a form of inferior legislation: 
its rights guarantees may be overridden by any other legislation parliament enacts in the 
future, or has enacted in the past. 27 Section 5 is subject to section 4, and prescribes that the 
rights and freedoms contained in the NZBORA shall be subject only to ‘such reasonable 
limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. 
Consequently, the NZBORA does not purport to protect rights absolutely, but instead forms 
what Paul Rishworth has termed a ‘bill of reasonable rights’28 that mandates overt judgements 
as to the justification for any limits to its guarantees. Section 6 requires that wherever an 
enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and freedoms contained in 
the NZBORA, that meaning shall be preferred. This instruction gives the courts a role in 
harmonising the statute books with the fundamental idea that all people possess certain 
important rights that the state should not limit unjustifiably. 
The interplay between sections 4, 5, and 6 is further discussed below.29 For the 
present, however, two points are important. First, when considering competing 
legislation that appears to authorise (or even require) an exercise of public power that 
unjustifiably limits NZBORA guaranteed rights, New Zealand’s courts are restricted to 
seeing if they ‘can’ interpret the statutory language in a way that does not authorise (or 
even require) such actions. If unable to do so, the courts are obligated to apply the 
competing legislation irrespective of any rights consequences that may follow. 30 
Therefore, and this is the second important point, Parliament retains the final word on 
exactly what the guaranteed rights mean, as well as the justifiability of any particular 
limit on those rights. As the next part outlines, the NZBORA as finally enacted was 
expressly intended to leave elected representatives formally free to continue to 
legislate as they think best. Any constraints that the NZBORA imposes upon that 
institution exist as a matter of pure political morality: it may be argued that parliament 
should not legislate inconsistently with that rights instrument, but not that it cannot do 
so.31  
When described in this abbreviated and simplified fashion, the NZBORA might 
appear to form a carefully crafted, theoretically grounded constitutional development.32 
In reality, however, it came into being in a somewhat messy fashion as the result of an 
overtly political compromise between those agitating for stronger-form, higher law 
constitutional protection for individual rights and those who objected to creating any 
sort of new rights protections at all. The NZBORA was, in that sense, almost no-one’s 
first choice form of rights instrument. In the next section we turn to explore how this 
compromise came into being, before examining why the circumstances of the 
NZBORA’s creation are of relevance to its development over the subsequent 26 years.  
27  As a consequence, the standard interpretative doctrine of ‘implied repeal’ — the presumption 
that where two statutes cannot be read consistently, the later in time statute prevails — does not 
apply to the NZBORA. See Ross Carter, Burrows and Carter: Statute Law in New Zealand 
(LexisNexis, 5th ed, 2015). 
28  Paul Rishworth, ‘Interpreting and Invalidating Enactments Under a Bill of Rights’ in Rick 
Bigwood (ed) The Statute: Making and Meaning (LexisNexis, 2004) 251, 277.  
29  See below part 4(c). 
30  Consequently, any acts by the executive branch (or other person or body performing a public 
function, power or duty) that impose an unjustified limit on one of the NZBORA rights, but 
which are authorised by competing legislation, are lawful regardless of their apparent 
inconsistency with the NZBORA. For the possible remedial options available to the courts in 
such cases see below part 4(d). 
31  Claudia Geiringer, ‘The Dead Hand of the Bill of Rights?’ (2007) 11 Otago Law Review 389, 
412-415.
32  Stephen Gardbaum argues that the NZBORA and similar instruments form a distinct 
‘commonwealth model’ of constitutionalism; see Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth 
Model of Constitutionalism: Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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III   THE NZBORA’S ORIGIN STORY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
A  A birth amidst political disagreement 
Although the NZBORA’s ‘pre-history’ 33  stretches back at least to 1960, its 
immediate genesis lay in the extent of governmental overreach that characterised the 
1975-1984 administration of Sir Robert Muldoon.34 Experience of that government 
informed what became a seminal text on New Zealand’s constitutional and government 
practices, Unbridled Power?. 35  Its author, Geoffrey Palmer, argued strongly that 
certain freedoms are fundamental to a free society and that a bill of rights could 
withdraw them from the realm of political controversy: ‘[t]hey would be higher values 
embodied in a higher law to which all other law would conform’.36 His was not a lone 
voice; in particular, key members of the judiciary echoed his views. In the year of 
Unbridled Power?’s publication — and its author’s first election as a member of 
parliament — Justice Owen Woodhouse opined extra-judicially that the ‘nebulous 
conventions’ protecting New Zealanders’ basic rights ‘should be given constitutional 
form which could not easily be repealed or amended and which would then receive the 
effective supervision of the Courts’.37 Also in 1979, Justice Robin Cooke delivered the 
first of a series of judgments in which he made obiter comments supporting the 
existence of a ‘common law bill of rights’ that imposed substantive constraints on 
parliamentary lawmaking powers.38 These views reached a crescendo in Taylor v New 
Zealand Poultry Board: ‘Some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even 
Parliament could not override them’.39  
This zenith of speculative judicial rights-talk was mirrored by legislative action. 
Following the 1984 general election, a new Labour Party Government took office with 
Palmer as its Minister of Justice. Under his stewardship, the NZBORA began its life as 
two draft bills with a public consultation document (the ‘White Paper’)40 tabled in 
Parliament in April of 1985. Inspired by Canada’s adoption in 1982 of the entrenched, 
33  Justice Susan Glazebrook, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: its operation and 
effectiveness, speech delivered to the South Australian State Legal Convention on 22 July, 2004, 
[2], footnote 3, available at <https://www.courtsofnz.govt.nz/speechpapers/Speech22-07-
2004.pdf>.  
34  David Erdos describes the Muldoon administration as providing an ‘aversive’ trigger for the 
NZBORA’s adoption; see David Erdos, Delegating Rights Protection: The Rise of Bills of Rights 
in the Westminster World (Oxford University Press, 2010) 94. See also Paul Rishworth, ‘The 
Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights’ in Grant Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and 
Freedoms (Brooker’s, 1995) 1, 9–13 (hereafter Rishworth, ‘The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of 
Rights’); K.J. Keith, ‘The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 — An Account of Its 
Preparation’ (2013) 11 New Zealand Journal of Public and Interntional Law 1, 8. 
35  Geoffrey W R Palmer, Unbridled Power?: An Interpretation of New Zealand’s Constitution and 
Government (Oxford University Press, 1st ed, 1979). 
36   Ibid 131. 
37  Owen Woodhouse, Government Under the Law: The JC Beaglehole Memorial Lecture, (New 
Zealand Council for Civil Liberties, 1979), 17.  
38  L v M [1979] 2 NZLR 519, 527 (CA); Brader v Ministry of Transport [1981] 1 NZLR 73, 78 
(CA); New Zealand Drivers’ Association v New Zealand Road Carriers [1982] 1 NZLR 374, 
390 (CA); Fraser v State Services Commission [1984] 1 NZLR 116, 121 (CA). See also Paul 
Rishworth, ‘Writing Things Unwritten: Common Law in New Zealand’s Constitution’ (2016) 14 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 137, 143–5. 
39  [1984] 1 NZLR 394, 398 (CA). See also Sir Robin Cooke, ‘Fundamentals’ [1988] New Zealand 
Law Journal 158, 163-65. 
40  Geoffrey Palmer, ‘A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper’ [1984-1985] I AJHR A6. 
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higher law Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the White Paper proposed a 
similar Bill of Rights for New Zealand to guarantee a range of civil and political rights 
and empower the judiciary to declare invalid any parliamentary enactment that 
imposed unjustifiable limits upon them. An extended period of deliberation on this 
proposal by the Justice and Law Reform Select Committee (‘the Committee’) meant it 
did not provide even an interim report back to Parliament until 1987,41 permitting 
Palmer (who was by this point the nation’s Deputy Prime Minister and Attorney-
General) to put his defense of the White Paper into the second edition of Unbridled 
Power (now with a confident absence of a question mark in the title).42 By this point, 
however, discussion surrounding the proposed Bill of Rights was not limited to Palmer 
and a few jurists. Rather, a host of voices articulated a range of hopes and fears vis-à-
vis the White Paper model. 43 
In this debate, optimism over the proposed change was dwarfed by the myriad 
anxieties associated with such major constitutional reform.44 Indeed, Sir Robin Cooke 
noted that: ‘Opposition stems from so many quarters and invokes so many different 
reasons that there is one obvious inference. The White Paper must have got the balance 
about right. A Bill of Rights that favours no one interest group cannot be all bad’.45 
Nevertheless, despite such confident claims regarding the measure’s utility, opponents 
of the White Paper model won the day.46 Where the Committee’s interim report had 
expressed hope regarding the proposal’s passage, its final report in 1988 accepted 
defeat.47 Although grumpily complaining that there was ‘limited public understanding’ 
of the Bill’s impact, the Committee concluded that ‘New Zealand is not yet ready, if it 
ever will be, for a fully fledged bill of rights along the lines of the White Paper draft’.48 
A majority of the Committee nevertheless saw merit in a rights instrument that was 
neither supreme law nor entrenched, as it ‘can provide valuable checks on the actions 
of the Executive’ as well as having ‘great educational and moral value’, and thus 
recommended the introduction of a bill of rights as an ordinary statute.49  
While these recommendations did not bind the Government, they reflected a 
political judgment that the original White Paper model was unachievable. 
Consequently, the NZBORA in its current form was introduced as a new Bill on 9 
                                                
41  Justice and Law Reform Committee ‘Interim Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee 
on a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand’ [1986-1987] X AJHR I.8A.  
42  Geoffrey Palmer, Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand’s Constitution and 
Government (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 1987) 219ff. 
43  See, eg, Andrew Sharp, ‘An Historical and Philosophical Perspective on the Proposal for A Bill 
of Rights for New Zealand’ in Andrew Sharp (ed) A Bill of Rights for New Zealand (Legal 
Research Foundation, 1985) 6; K J Keith, ‘A Bill of Rights for New Zealand? Judicial Review 
versus Democracy’ in ibid 49;  B V Harris, ‘Bill of Rights: Redistribution of Power’ [1985] New 
Zealand Law Journal 49; Guy Brougham Chapman, ‘A Bill of Wrongs: The Argument Against 
the Proposed Bill of Rights’ [1985] New Zealand Law Journal 226; Paul East, ‘The Proposed 
Bill of Rights’ [1985] New Zealand Law Journal 368; K J Keith, ‘The Bill of Rights: Reply to a 
Criticism’ [1985] New Zealand Law Journal 370; J A Smillie, ‘F W Guest Memorial Lecture: A 
Bill of Rights for New Zealand? An Alternative Proposal’ (1985) 6 Otago Law Review 175; 
Jerome B Elkind & Antony Shaw, A Standard for Justice: A Critical Commentary on the 
Proposed Bill of Rights for New Zealand (Oxford University Press, 1986).  
44  See Erdos, above n 34, 100-101. 
45  Sir Robin Cooke, ‘A Standard for Justice’ [1986] New Zealand Law Journal 149. 
46  Indeed, as David Erdos notes, most of Palmer’s colleagues in the Labour Government were 
themselves disinclined to support the White Paper model as it threatened to restrict their powers 
now that they had won office; see Erdos, above n 34 at 97. 
47  Justice and Law Reform Committee ‘Final Report of the Justice and Law Reform Committee on 
a White Paper on a Bill of Rights for New Zealand’ [1987-1990] XVII AJHR I.8C. 
48  Ibid 3. 
49  Ibid. 
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October 1989, again moved by its architect and, by this stage, New Zealand’s Prime 
Minister.50 The Government adopted the Committee’s recommendation that the new 
Bill should only have ordinary law status. The White Paper’s proposed remedies 
provision — allowing the Court to award ‘just and appropriate’ remedies for breaches 
of rights — also was absent. Indeed, Palmer was at pains to reassure Parliament that 
‘the Bill creates no new legal remedies for courts to grant. The judges will continue to 
have the same legal remedies as they have now, irrespective of whether the Bill of 
Rights is an issue’.51 However, despite now promoting a much-weakened facsimile of 
his White Paper proposal, Palmer was of the view that it still was a valuable measure. 
Doug Graham, opposition spokesperson for Justice, was not of the same opinion, and 
questioned the lack of clarity surrounding the amount of judicial power bestowed by 
the Bill:  
[…] under clause 4 of the Bill, the courts do have some power to interpret the 
restrictions on the rights set out in the Bill. Clause 4, entitled ‘Justified 
limitations’, provides: ‘The rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of 
Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can 
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. What does that 
mean? Does it mean that the courts have a great deal of power, or that they do 
not have very much power at all?52 
The Bill received its final reading on August 21, 1990, two weeks before Palmer 
would resign as Prime Minister and two months before the Labour Government would 
suffer its largest electoral defeat since 1935. Palmer attested that, while not the 
outcome he would have preferred, ‘[t]he result is that we now have an extraordinarily 
useful addition to the constitutional structure …’.53 Palmer omitted to mention the 
Bill’s new clause 3A (which would become section 4 of the NZBORA) and the 
emphasis on parliamentary sovereignty it represents. He left that job to his colleague, 
Richard Northey, who, to assuage opposition concerns, described its effect as follows: 
‘[In Clause 3A], the Government is specifically telling the courts that that is the way 
the laws that have been set down in Parliament are to be interpreted. That has been 
made even clearer — it is the very opposite to handing sovereignty over’.54 
Thus, upon the enactment of the NZBORA a week later on August 28, 1990 by 
way of a bare majority vote cast along party lines, the hopes and fears that were so 
vividly and thoroughly communicated when debating the White Paper were both 
apparently dashed and calmed respectively.55  The hopes that the NZBORA would 
impose an effective restraint on all forms of public power through strong-form judicial 
review were sunk, but the fears that the NZBORA would represent a dangerous and 
unnecessary transfer of sovereignty were assuaged. Instead, there were new 
predictions: that the courts would possess ‘no new legal remedies’ and would not act in 
excess of their powers when confronted with a clear legislative pronouncement. 
However, the compromise nature of the newly enacted rights instrument served only to 
paper over the original schism in views. Upon its coming into force, these once again 
emerged into full sight. 
50  (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13039. 
51  (14 August 1990) 509 NZPD 3450. 
52  (10 October 1989) 502 NZPD 13045. 
53  (21 August 1990) 50 NZPD 3760. 
54  (21 August 1990) 50 NZPD 3763-4. 
55  See Claudia Geiringer, ‘Inaugural Lecture: Mr Bulwark and the Protection of Human Rights’ 
(2014) 45 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 367, 370 (describing the NZBORA as 
‘a document born from compromise and thwarted ambition’.)  
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B  The NZBORA’s fundamentally unstable meaning 
Rather than reconciling the competing perspectives on the original White Paper 
proposal in a unifying synthesis, the NZBORA’s passage instead left open this 
‘constitutional enigma’s’ ultimate meaning.56 Since it contained sufficient ambiguity 
and vagueness about its intentions and possible effects, both proponents and opponents 
of proposed change were able to read into it what they wished to see. Claudia 
Geiringer describes this fundamental normative uncertainty regarding the legislation’s 
raison d’être in the following terms:  
there are two competing narratives about the significance of the [NZBORA], 
neither of which has achieved ascendency. According to the first 
‘constitutional’ narrative, the Act ‘occupies … the same space that higher law 
bills of rights occupy in other countries — with only such differences as are 
demanded by its explicit preservation of an ultimate parliamentary supremacy 
in s 4’. Conversely, the second narrative emphasises the document’s status as 
part of ordinary law and regards the instrument as fundamentally different in 
kind from fully constitutionalised bills of rights.57  
We agree that the circumstances of the NZBORA’s birth inevitably spawned such 
diverging interpretations. We also agree that no singular narrative has yet achieved 
orthodox status, much less hegemony, within New Zealand’s constitutional theory and 
practice. However, we prefer to frame the matter in terms of competing inflationary 
and deflationary accounts of the NZBORA’s point and purpose. That is to say, 
although the NZBORA may never have been able to replicate entirely the original 
White Paper model, emphasising its fundamentally constitutional nature and the 
normative importance of the rights that it guarantees can help to move the final 
instrument closer to that initial vision. By contrast, the fact that the White Paper 
proposal was roundly rejected by the people’s elected representatives in Parliament, 
and specific steps were taken to constrain the judiciary’s reach, might justify 
permitting the NZBORA only the most minimalist application. Following the 
NZBORA’s passage into law, various commentators quickly deployed these claims as 
they sought to predict what the new rights instrument would mean for the nation’s 
constitutional practices.58 
Thus, from its earliest days the NZBORA has attracted both inflationary and 
deflationary predictions as to its probable effects on New Zealand’s law and 
governance. These competing inflationary and deflationary accounts set the backdrop 
for the NZBORA’s ultimate application. The judiciary faced interrelated questions 
over when it could examine the exercise of public power to determine if it imposed an 
unjustified limit on rights, as well as what remedies ought to be available in those cases 
where an unjustifiable rights breach was found. How it answered these questions 
56  Anna Adams, ‘Competing Conceptions of the Constitution: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 and the Cooke Court of Appeal’ [1996] New Zealand Law Review 368, 368. 
57  Geiringer, What’s the Story?, above n 12, 163 (internal citations omitted). 
58  See eg, David M Paciocco, ‘The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: Curial Cures for a 
Debilitated Bill’ [1990] New Zealand Recent Law Review 353, 353; Paul Rishworth, ‘The 
Potential of the New Zealand Bill of Rights’ [1990] New Zealand Law Journal 68; Anthony 
Shaw and Andrew Butler, ‘The Bill of Rights Comes Alive (1) ’ [1991] New Zealand Law 
Journal 400;  Jerome B. Elkind, ‘On the Limited Applicability of section 4, Bill of Rights Act’ 
[1993] New Zealand Law Journal 111; Michael Luis Principe, ‘The Demise of Parliamentary 
Supremacy? Canadian and American Influences Upon the New Zealand Judiciary’s 
Interpretation of the Bill of Rights Act of 1990’ (1993) 16 Loyola of Los Angeles International 
and Comparative Law Journal 16. 
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ultimately would determine the NZBORA’s disciplinary reach over the various 
branches of the New Zealand government. In the following section we trace the 
judicial response and explain how this reflects the broader conceptual disagreement 
over what the NZBORA was intended to be and thus what it may be used to achieve.  
IV   JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE NZBORA 
As noted above, the removal of the White Paper’s original proposal to empower 
the courts to grant “just and appropriate” remedies meant the NZBORA’s finally 
enacted text largely was silent on this matter. This legislative void meant that the 
judiciary had primary responsibility for determining what consequences (if any) should 
follow from its application. Section 4 did rule out one potential outcome by 
specifically prohibiting the courts from invalidating or refusing to apply parliamentary 
enactments they consider inconsistent with the NZBORA. Other remedies applied 
simply as a matter of already established legal principles: persons or organisations 
covered by the NZBORA that unjustifiably limit a guaranteed right act in breach of a 
parliamentary enactment. Consequently, that rights-limiting action is unlawful, and the 
courts were able to declare it as such (as well as make other existing administrative law 
orders prohibiting further such action). 59  Beyond such relatively uncontroversial 
propositions, however, lay a host of more difficult challenges. When can a court 
examine an exercise of public power for consistency with the NZBORA, especially 
where it appears to be authorised by a clear and unambiguous provision in a competing 
parliamentary enactment? And, if the courts find an exercise of public power is 
inconsistent with the rights instrument, are there any NZBORA-specific remedies that 
it may grant? And, if there are some such remedies available, when and on what basis 
will they be given? Answering such questions has produced significant remedial give 
and take, with the judiciary searching for an elusive Goldilocks zone: the courts must 
have sufficient capability to make good the legislative promise to ‘guarantee’ the 
affirmed rights whilst not supercharging the legislation by turning it into a vehicle for 
the courts to provide relief for each and every rights breach committed by those 
exercising public power. The various twists and turns of that search then reflect the 
ongoing uncertainty about the NZBORA’s status in New Zealand’s constitutional 
arrangements, with the courts variously adopting inflationary and deflationary views of 
the legislation’s point and purpose.  
In this section, we outline the development of judicial practice with reference to 
four specific remedial responses. The first set of remedies relates to breaches of the 
NZBORA’s various criminal process rights. Where evidence against a person later 
charged with a criminal offence is obtained in a way that unjustifiably limits such 
rights, what should the courts do with it? Equally, what should the judicial response be 
where holding a criminal trial at all would breach a person’s NZBORA guaranteed 
rights? The second remedy applies beyond the specific area of criminal process. If a 
breach of a NZBORA guaranteed right occurs, should a remedy of monetary damages 
be available to vindicate that rights breach? If so, when and how ought the courts to 
grant it? The third remedy relates to situations where a competing parliamentary 
enactment appears to authorise an exercise of public power that is inconsistent with the 
NZBORA. To what extent should judges seek to rework parliament’s apparent intent 
so as to avoid a NZBORA inconsistent outcome? Finally, the last remedial issue arises 
in situations where the courts have determined that a parliamentary enactment cannot 
be applied consistently with the NZBORA. Can the judiciary make a formal 
59  Unless, that is, a competing Act of Parliament authorises or even requires the action in question. 
In such cases, section 4 means that the rights limiting action is not unlawful; see below part 4(c). 
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declaration of that fact, specifically designed to pressure parliament to revisit the 
matter?   
A  Criminal justice remedies 
The NZBORA’s initial, and subsequently greatest, impact occurred in relation to 
the practices of law enforcement and prosecution authorities. A number of reasons 
account for that fact. The interaction between public officials and individuals is at its 
most fraught where the state’s coercive powers are deployed to forcibly restrain, 
condemn and deprive a person of their property or liberty. Such interactions also occur 
frequently in the criminal justice sector, increasing the potential opportunities for an 
individual’s rights to be unjustifiably limited. Broad statutory provisions and common 
law powers govern criminal procedure, providing ample legal space for the judiciary to 
insert new rights-based constraints. Finally, the judiciary already had significant pre-
NZBORA experience with monitoring the behaviour of law enforcement and 
prosecutorial authorities in relation to matters such as the admissibility of unfairly 
obtained evidence60 or the like. For these various reasons, the courts moved quickly to 
develop two new remedial responses for unjustified breaches of the NZBORA’s 
various guaranteed criminal procedure rights.61 
The first such remedy applied where evidence was obtained in breach of these 
rights. In the years immediately following the NZBORA’s enactment, the courts gave 
the rights in question an expansive reading; deciding (for example) that the section 
23(1)(b) right to obtain legal counsel is engaged by a requirement to take a breath test 
for alcohol-impaired driving,62 while the section 21 right against unreasonable search 
and seizure was interpreted widely to protect ‘those values or interests which make up 
the concept of privacy’.63 The judiciary also fashioned a prima facie exclusion remedy 
for evidence obtained in breach of these broadly interpreted guarantees, whereby any 
such ‘tainted evidence’ 64  could not be used at trial except in specific limited 
circumstances.65 This judicial approach to both the ambit of the particular rights and 
the consequences of a breach displayed an inflationary view of the NZBORA, in which 
the courts had a special responsibility for ‘vindicating rights’ 66  by visiting 
appropriately severe remedial consequences should law enforcement officials 
unjustifiably limit them. The fundamental importance of these individual rights was 
taken to require a commensurate response on the part of the institution charged with 
their oversight in individual cases.  
The judiciary’s initial enthusiasm for the NZBORA’s transformative potential did 
not last, however. By 1998, commentators were even suggesting that the rights 
instrument was in ‘mortal peril’.67 New Zealand’s Court of Appeal, which was at that 
60  See, eg, R v Coombs [1985] 1 NZLR 318, 321 (CA). 
61  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) ss 21-24. 
62  Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
63  R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290, 319 (CA). 
64 Richard Mahoney, ‘Exclusion of Evidence’ in Paul Rishworth, Grant Huscroft, Scott Optican 
and Richard Mahoney (eds), The New Zealand Bill of Rights (Oxford University Press, 2003) 
770.  
65  R v Kirifi [1992] 2 NZLR 8 (CA); R v Butcher [1992] 2 NZLR 257 (CA); R v Goodwin [1993] 2 
NZLR 153 (CA). For a discussion of the development of this remedy see Marwood v 
Commissioner of Police [2016] NZSC 139 at [23]-[27]. 
66  Goodwin [1993] 2 NZLR 153, 194; R v Te Kira [1993] 3 NZLR 257 (CA); Richard Mahoney, 
‘Vindicating Rights: Excluding Evidence Obtained in Violation of the Bill of Rights’ in Grant 
Huscroft & Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms (Brooker’s, 1995).  
67  Hart Schwartz, ‘The Short Happy Life and Tragic Death of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ 
[1998] New Zealand Law Review 259, 260. 
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time the nation’s highest domestically-based court, 68  began to reassess its earlier 
inflationary methodology by stating that it was more appropriate to approach the 
NZBORA in a ‘common sense way, commensurate with proper public expectation.’69 
Of particular significance was the case of R v Grayson and Taylor,70 reversing earlier 
precedent that held significant unlawful conduct by the Police compelled a finding that 
a search or seizure was ‘unreasonable’ (and thus a breach of section 21 of the 
NZBORA). The Court then proceeded to weaken the remedial consequences for 
breaching criminal procedure rights in R v Shaheed, 71  where six of a full seven-
member bench agreed that the existing prima facie exclusion of tainted evidence 
should be replaced with a balancing test to determine if that remedial response is 
proportionate to a particular rights breach. The explicit justification for this remedial 
recalibration was that the previous bright-line approach risked overvaluing the rights in 
question: 
A system of justice will not command the respect of the community if each 
and every substantial breach of an accused’s rights leads almost inevitably to 
the exclusion of crucial evidence which is reliable and probative of a serious 
crime. The vindication will probably be seen as unbalanced and 
disproportionate to the circumstances of the breach.72 
Consequently, contravention — even deliberate contravention — of one of the 
NZBORA’s criminal procedure rights is now only a factor for the court to consider 
when deciding whether to exclude the tainted evidence.73 Set against this consideration 
is a non-exhaustive range of factors, including the nature and quality of the evidence 
obtained,74 the centrality of the evidence to the prosecution’s case75 and the seriousness 
of the alleged crime.76 A court must then determine in the individual circumstances of 
the case whether the balance favours protecting the right in question by excluding the 
tainted evidence.  
Chief Justice Elias’s dissent in Shaheed criticised her colleagues’ dilution of the 
NZBORA’s guarantees and argued that the new balancing approach could incentivise 
rights breaches by law enforcement officials.77 A prominent criminal lawyer echoed 
these sentiments, accusing the Court of Appeal majority of paying mere ‘lip service’ to 
the NZBORA out of embarrassment that the instrument could ‘help criminals’. 78 
Subsequent commentary also deplored the somewhat ad hoc nature of resulting 
judicial decisions on excluding tainted evidence and the uncertainty produced by such 
outcomes.79 Nevertheless, Parliament chose to codify the new ‘balancing’ approach in 
the Evidence Act 2006. 80  We may see a more deflationary understanding of the 
68  Until January 1, 2004, the Privy Council (based in London) sat at the apex of New Zealand's 
curial hierarchy. From that date a New Zealand-based Supreme Court replaced it; see Supreme 
Court Act 2003 (NZ) s2.  
69  R v Elliot (1997) 4 HRNZ 648, 649 (CA). 
70  [1997] 1 NZLR 399 (CA).  
71  R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377 (CA). 
72  Ibid [143] (Blanchard J). 
73  Ibid [147]-[148] (Blanchard J). 
74  Ibid [151] (Blanchard J). 
75  Ibid [152] (Blanchard J). 
76  Ibid. See Underwood v R [2016] NZCA 312. 
77  R v Shaheed [2002] 2 NZLR 377, [19] (Elias CJ).  
78  Robert Lithgow, ‘When Ignorance is Bliss’ [2002] New Zealand Law Journal 151, 151.    
79  See Scott Optican, ‘R v Shaheed: The Demise of the Prima Facie Exclusion Rule’ [2003] New 
Zealand Law Journal 103; Scott Optican and Peter Sankoff, ‘The New Exclusionary Rule: A 
Preliminary Assessment of R v Shaheed’ [2003] New Zealand Law Review 1, 18–41. 
80  Evidence Act 2006 (NZ), s 30. 
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NZBORA reflected in these combined judicial and legislative actions. While the 
instrument’s criminal procedure guarantees remain somewhat important 
considerations, they should not automatically trump other weighty matters in the 
justice system. In particular, the wider societal interest in holding individuals to 
account for serious criminal offending still should, in appropriate cases, override even 
flagrant breaches of individual rights. The job of the courts is thus not to act as 
enforcers of a paramount set of protections against all failures to respect individual 
rights, but rather to ensure that the criminal justice system functions in a manner that 
shows enough respect to individual rights. 
Performing that role in individual cases reopens the question of how much 
respect is ‘enough’. Whenever the remedy of excluding tainted evidence arises, a court 
must explicitly determine what ‘weight’81 to give the factors on each side of the scale. 
For example, when the New Zealand Supreme Court gave its most thorough 
consideration to date of the matter in the NZBORA context,82 the five members split 3-
2 on whether various forms of tainted evidence should be excluded from trial.83 As 
Scott Optican notes: 
Those Justices favouring the full admissibility of the tainted but highly 
probative [evidence] … emphasised the seriousness of the offending together 
with facts suggesting that, while acting illegally, police were concerned to 
prevent crimes of significant violence, had no effective investigative 
alternative, and did not proceed in bad faith. Those Justices generally 
advocating the opposite … considered that the gravity of the crimes charged, 
or the seriousness of any criminal conduct suspected at the time of the 
unlawful [law enforcement activity], was outweighed by the knowing or 
reckless nature of police investigative improprieties, together with the 
significant police breach of the accused’s rights under 21 of the Bill of Rights. 
For [the final judge] — who, to one extent or another, agreed with both of 
these opposing perspectives — the deciding factor in admitting some but not 
all of the improperly obtained evidence was the overall seriousness of the 
offending faced by each individual defendant in the case.84 
Consequently, differing assumptions about how much the rights in question 
matter when placed alongside other socially important considerations led the judges to 
differing conclusions on whether the evidence in question should be admitted at trial.
That process in turn reflects conflicting judicial perceptions of the NZBORA’s place in 
the nation’s constitutional order. Is it a statement of fundamental constraints on state 
power such that unjustified breaches of its rights ought to override virtually all other 
considerations, or instead a recitation of only somewhat-important matters of social 
policy that are potentially subordinate to other relevant concerns?
Unsurprisingly, the second remedial development in this area largely replicates 
the trajectory of the exclusion of evidence remedy. In Martin v Tauranga District 
Court,85 the Court of Appeal held that an NZBORA inconsistent failure to try an 
accused without undue delay86 could be remedied by a ‘stay of proceeding’ preventing 
81  Ibid s 30(2)(b). 
82  Hamed v R [2011] NZSC 101, [2012] 2 NZLR 305. See also R v Chetty [2016] NZSC 68; 
Marwood v Commissioner of Police [2016] NZSC 139, [50]–[52]. 
83  For discussion, see Scott Optican, ‘Hamed, Williams and the Exclusionary Rule: Critiquing the 
Supreme Court’s Approach to s 30 of the Evidence Act 2006’ [2012] New Zealand Law Review 
605 (hereafter Optican, ‘Hamed, Williams’). 
84  Optican, Hamed, Williams, ibid 621 (internal citations omitted). 
85  [1995] 2 NZLR 419 (CA). 
86  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 25(b). 
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further prosecutorial action. The functional, even if not formal, effect of a stay is 
equivalent to a full acquittal. Its application in the NZBORA context went beyond the 
traditional common law protection against an abuse of process threatening a trial’s 
fundamental fairness87  to instead address the ‘affront to human dignity caused by 
drawn-out legal process’.88 Once again, this remedial development was justified by a 
need to fully vindicate the right in question, as it had ‘been affirmed by the New 
Zealand Parliament in accordance with this country’s international obligations, and it 
must be given due meaning and effect in the New Zealand context’.89 To do so, the 
Court took guidance from the Canadian Supreme Court’s approach under its higher 
law, entrenched Charter. 90 However, the bench then divided on whether a stay of 
proceeding should automatically issue in cases of undue delay: one member believed it 
should;91 three believed it was but one of a range of possible remedial responses;92 
while the final offered no opinion.93  
However, subsequent concern that the stay remedy had become too readily 
available in cases of delayed trials led New Zealand’s Supreme Court to significantly 
reign it back. In Williams v R,94 a unanimous bench first narrowed the reach of the 
right by emphasising that it is not determined by temporal factors alone, rather its 
application ‘is a function of time, cause and circumstance’.95  It also distinguished 
between a breach of the accused’s NZBORA right to be tried without undue delay and 
the right to a fair trial.96 Where a trial cannot be conducted in a ‘fair’ manner for any 
reason (including delay), a stay of proceeding automatically issues on the basis that it 
is inimical to the justice system to convict a person using such a process.97 However, 
the Supreme Court indicated that where a fair trial is possible, stays of proceeding 
ought only to issue where ‘a delay [in trial] has been egregious, or there has been 
prosecutorial misconduct or a sanction is required against a prosecutor who does not 
proceed promptly to trial after being directed by a court to do so’.98 In respect of the 
immediate case, the Court accepted that a gap of some five years between arrest and 
final trial constituted an undue delay. Nevertheless, the appellant was lucky to even 
receive a diminution in his final sentence in response, while seven co-accused who had 
been granted stays in proceedings for lesser offending ‘should also regard themselves 
as fortunate in avoiding trial and the consequent risk of conviction and sentence’.99 The 
Court simply did not see the rights guarantee involved as being important enough to 
justify this outcome in any except the most ‘egregious’ cases.100 If the courts were to 
allow the rights instrument to result in large numbers of accused individuals evading 
trial, they would be improperly exaggerating its importance in New Zealand’s legal 
87  See, eg, Moevao v Department of Labour [1980] 1 NZLR 464, 481-2.   
88  Martin [1995] 2 NZLR 419, 429 (Casey J). 
89  Ibid 430 (Hardie Boys J). 
90  See R v Morin [1992] 1 SCR 771, adopted at Martin [1995] 2 NZLR 419, 420, 422 (Cooke P), at 
433 (McKay J). 
91  Martin [1995] 2 NZLR 419, 425 (Cooke P). 
92  Ibid 432 (Hardie Boys J), at 430 (Casey J), at 434 (McKay J). 
93  Ibid 427 (Richardson J). 
94  [2009] NZSC 41, [2009] 2 NZLR 750. 
95  Ibid [12]. 
96  Ibid [11]. 
97  See R v Vaihu [2010] NZCA 145, [34]; Police v McGrath (No 2) [2012] NZHC 1018, [28]; 
Wilson v R [2015] NZSC 71, [119]. 
98  Williams [2009] 2 NZLR 750, [18]. 
99  Ibid [22]. 
100  A message received and acted on by lower courts since; see Vaihu [2010] NZCA 145, [25]–[34]; 
Miller v R [2010] NZCA 380. 
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order.101 So as with the issue of exclusion of tainted evidence, the desire to give the 
NZBORA some, but only enough, importance underpinned the judiciary’s 
recalibration of the stay of proceeding remedy. 
B  Damages for breaching the NZBORA 
Commentators at the time of the NZBORA’s enactment had suggested that 
potential remedies for infringement could include non-tort based monetary awards.102 
Telling against such a development, however, was the fact that the legislation did not 
expressly authorise such damages; indeed, a general “just and appropriate” remedies 
power had been removed from the original proposal. Furthermore, both individual 
public actors and the Crown generally appeared to possess a statutory immunity from 
liability for many kinds of NZBORA inconsistent actions.103 Consequently, awarding 
damages as a remedy for NZBORA inconsistent actions necessarily would involve a 
considerable degree of judicial innovation. Some three years after the legislation’s 
passage, a majority of the Court of Appeal was prepared to take this step in Simpson v 
Attorney-General (‘Baigent’s Case’),104 a decision that arguably still represents a high 
water mark of the inflationary approach to the NZBORA.105  
Baigent’s Case was a pre-trial strike out application by the Crown against a claim 
for damages after the Police allegedly continued to conduct a warranted search after 
being alerted to the fact they were at the wrong address. The Crown’s position was that 
even if all the plaintiff’s claimed facts were proven, thus establishing the search was 
‘unreasonable’ in terms of section 21 of the NZBORA, the Court could not grant a 
monetary remedy. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument by a 4-1 majority, 
ruling that damages were available for breach of the NZBORA and none of the various 
statutory immunities from suit enjoyed by the Crown precluded its application in the 
immediate case. 106  The rationale for doing so was an avowedly inflationary 
understanding of the NZBORA’s purpose. Various members of the majority declared it 
was ‘essential to [the NZBORA’s] worth, that the Courts are … able to grant 
appropriate and effective remedies where rights have been infringed’;107 that ‘[the 
courts] would fail in our duty if we did not give an effective remedy to a person whose 
legislatively affirmed rights have been infringed’; 108  and that it is ‘impossible to 
interpret the [NZBORA] as simply making a pious declaration of so called rights 
which could be infringed with impunity and would confer no remedy for their 
breach’.109 Consequently, the Court recognised a stand-alone, public law remedy of 
damages for breaching the NZBORA that lies against the Crown independently of and 
alongside any pre-existing private law causes of action that a plaintiff may possess.110 
The Court’s remedial innovation in Baigent’s Case drew decidedly mixed 
responses. Critics decried both the inflated influence that they believed the new 
101  See Vaihu, ibid [51]–[55] (emphasising the countervailing ‘strong public interest’ in seeing 
serious criminal offences brought to trial). 
102  See above, n 58. 
103  See especially Crown Proceedings Act 1950 (NZ) s 6(5). 
104  [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA). See also Auckland Unemployed Workers’ Rights Centre Inc v 
Attorney-General [1994] 3 NZLR 720 (CA). 
105  See Grant Huscroft, ‘Civil Remedies for the Breach of Rights’ in Rishworth, et al (eds), above n 
64, 811, 814. 
106  For a discussion of the decision, see Lisa Tortell, Monetary Remedies for Breach of Human 
Rights: A Comparative Study (Hart Publishing, 2006) 59-61. 
107  Baigent’s Case [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 702 (Hardie Boys J). 
108  Ibid 676 (Cooke P). 
109  Ibid 718 (McKay J). 
110  Ibid 677 (Cooke P). ‘ n ’ “ m ”  
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remedy would bestow on the NZBORA111  and the judicial reasoning deployed to 
justify its existence.112 By contrast, others took a more sanguine view of the Court of 
Appeal’s action and the purpose it accorded the NZBORA. In an analysis of the rights 
instrument’s first five years, Paul Rishworth argued that a judiciary that adopted a 
more deflationary approach than that displayed in Baigent’s Case ‘would run the risk 
of trivialising [these rights and freedoms] while simultaneously bringing itself into 
disrepute’. 113 Rishworth’s argument thus was that Court of Appeal’s decision merely 
actualised the NZBORA’s lofty objectives: it might be an ordinary statute, but the 
rights it guaranteed required the sort of generous and purposive approach that produced 
outcomes such as Baigent’s Case. Consequently, labels of judicial activism were inapt 
if only because the agency such descriptions required was absent; the very nature of 
the NZBORA left the courts with no other option as to how to proceed.  
Rishworth’s conclusion was echoed in a review of Baigent’s Case requested by 
the Government from the New Zealand Law Commission. It recommended acceptance 
of the damages remedy’s existence and no legislative override of the judicial 
innovation.114 This counsel was followed and the Crown subsequently acknowledged 
the courts’ general power to grant monetary awards for breach of the NZBORA.115 
However, what remained unresolved was just how widely available and generous such 
remedial awards should be. In answering those matters, the courts adopted a markedly 
more deflationary view than was evident in Baigent’s Case itself. Whilst the 
constitutionally significant, rights-affirming status of the NZBORA may have provided 
support for the damages remedy in theory, when it came to deploying the remedy in 
practice the judiciary accorded the instrument a far less important role.116 
The first limitation the courts imposed on the damages remedy was to emphasise 
its discretionary nature. Even in Baigent’s Case itself the majority acknowledged that 
there is no right to obtain damages for any given breach of the NZBORA.117 The 
Supreme Court, in its leading decision on the availability and quantum of NZBORA 
damages, Taunoa v Attorney General, held that the judicial task is ‘to find an overall 
remedy or set of remedies which is sufficient to deter any repetition by agents of the 
state and to vindicate the breach of the right in question’.118 Consequently, a monetary 
award is a last resort; only available where a court believes no other remedial response 
will adequately vindicate the plaintiff’s rights.119  Following that approach, the courts 
have been notably reluctant to conclude that achieving this end requires that the Crown 
pay damages. Indeed, the Court of Appeal recently noted that: 
111  John A Smillie, ‘The Allure of “ Rights Talk”: Baigent’s Case in the Court of Appeal’ (1993) 8 
Otago Law Review 188, 204; John A Smillie, ‘“ Fundamental Rights”, Parliamentary Supremacy 
and the New Zealand Court of Appeal’  (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 209, 216. 
112  James Allan, ‘Speaking with the Tongues of Angels’ (1994) 1 Bill of Rights Bulletin 2, 5. 
113  Rishworth, The Birth and Rebirth of the Bill of Rights, above n 34, 29. 
114  New Zealand Law Commission Crown Liability and Judicial Immunity: A Response to Baigent’s 
Case and Harvey v Derrick (NZLC R37, 1997) 2. See also Geoff McLay, ‘Damages for Breach 
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act —Why Aren’t They a Sufficient Remedy?’ [2008] New 
Zealand Law Review 333, 339-340. 
115  Taunoa v Attorney General [2007] NZSC 70; [2008] 1 NZLR 429, [4]. 
116  Juliet Phillpot, ‘Damages Under the United Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998 and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990’ (2007) 5 New Zealand Journal of Public and International 
Law 211, 227; McLay, above n 114, at 334; Jason N E Varuhas, Damages and Human Rights 
(Hart Publishing, 2016) 222-225.  
117  Baigent’s Case [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 692 (Casey J), at 703 (Hardie Boys J), at 718 (McKay J). 
See also Link Technology 2000 Ltd v Attorney General [2006] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
118  Taunoa [2008] 1 NZLR 429, [253] (Blanchard J). See also at [372] (McGrath J). 
119  Attorney General v Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204, 241 (CA, Glazebrook J). 
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in most cases in which damages are eventually awarded, the conduct 
concerned has involved physical restraint, direct infliction of physical harm, 
or a prolonged or significant deprivation of liberty. These cases span in 
seriousness from physical detention, handcuffing, to inappropriate solitary 
confinement and physical violence in prison similar situations. … Conversely 
there are very few cases in which [NZBORA] damages have been awarded 
where no physical damage or interference with liberty has occurred. Where 
damages have been awarded in such cases, this has typically been to reflect 
equivalence with tortious claims, or on the basis of clear pecuniary loss 
arising directly from the breach of the right itself.120 
 
In addition to viewing awards of monetary damages as only infrequently 
necessary to vindicate a rights breach, the courts also have emphasised that the 
quantum of any damages award should not be ‘extravagant’.121 The amounts awarded 
by the courts only rarely have crept into the low five-figure range,122 with the higher 
courts repeatedly reducing (and never increasing) the sums given at trial.123 In Taunoa, 
for example, a majority of the Supreme Court cut the amounts awarded to several 
prisoners who had been subjected to unlawful punishments (including solitary 
confinement under extremely restrictive conditions) in breach of the NZBORA.124 For 
one prisoner who had experienced some 32 months of mistreatment, damages were cut 
from NZ$65,000 to $NZ35,000 (which still remains the largest final award granted by 
a New Zealand court). The limited quantum of damages available in the few cases 
where a court accepts an award is necessary have caused some to cast doubt on the 
remedy’s basic utility. 125  Consequently, the inflationary view of the NZBORA 
underpinning the creation of a damages remedy has not carried over into that remedy’s 
application.126 Rather, the courts have treated the availability of public law damages 
primarily as a gloss on common law protections already in existence at the time of the 
NZBORA’s enactment.127  
A final judicial retreat from the ruling in Baigent’s Case brought the conflict 
between inflationary and deflationary accounts of the NZBORA to the fore. In 
Attorney-General v Chapman,128 the Supreme Court was required to decide if damages 
for breaching the NZBORA could be awarded where the judiciary was responsible for 
the rights breach. The case arose out of the Court of Appeal’s practice of dismissing 
criminal appeals (including Mr Chapman’s) on an ex parte basis, which in turn 
breached the appellants’ NZBORA right to an appeal129 and natural justice.130 After 
                                                
120  Attorney General v Van Essen [2015] NZCA 22, [106]–[107] (internal citations omitted). See 
also the collated synopsis of cases in Attorney General v Van Essen [2015] NZCA 22, appendix 
1; Wright v Bhosale [2016] NZAR 335, 354–355 (HC); Andrew Butler & Petra Butler, The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary (LexisNexis, 2nd ed, 2014) 1600–1606. 
121  Baigent’s Case [1994] 3 NZLR 667, 678 (Cooke P); Taunoa [2008] 1 NZLR 429, [107] (Elias 
CJ).  
122  See the sources cited above, n 120.  
123  See, eg, Dunlea v Attorney General [2000] 3 NZLR 136 (CA); Attorney-General v P F Sugrue 
Ltd [2004] 1 NZLR 220 (CA); Udompun [2005] 3 NZLR 204; Van Essen [2015] NZCA 22. 
124  Taunoa [2008] 1 NZLR 429.  
125  See Philpott, above n 116, at 233. See also Wright [2016] NZAR 335, [93]. 
126  See McLay, above n 114, 335. 
127  See Wilding v Attorney-General [2003] 3 NZLR 787, [14] (CA). See also Andrew Butler and 
Petra Butler, ‘Protecting Rights’ in Caroline Morris, Jonathan Boston & Petra Butler (eds) 
Reconstituting the Constitution (Springer, 2011) 157, 170; Philpott, supra n 106, at 219-224; 
McLay, supra n 114, at 345-350. 
128  [2011] NZSC 110, [2012] 1 NZLR 462. 
129  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 25(h). 
130  Ibid s 27(2).  
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this procedure was declared unlawful,131 Mr Chapman obtained a new appeal hearing 
that quashed his conviction and his subsequent retrial was abandoned, resulting in the 
dismissal of the original charges against him. However, as Mr Chapman already had 
served his prison sentence and been released by the time his conviction was quashed, 
he sought damages to fully vindicate the breach of his NZBORA rights. The Crown in 
turn defended the claim on the basis that a monetary remedy should not be available 
where the judicial branch is responsible for a NZBORA breach. 
The Supreme Court denied Mr. Chapman’s claim and accepted the Crown’s 
argument by a 3-2 majority. For the minority, the inflationary reasoning underpinning 
Baigent’s Case was directly applicable:  
it would be contrary to the scheme and purpose of the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act if those deprived of rights through judicial action are denied the 
opportunity to obtain damages from the State, where an award of damages is 
necessary to provide effective remedy.132  
As damages then were the only remedy of any real utility to Mr Chapman, the courts 
ought to countenance them to ensure proper vindication of a rights breach.133 The 
overriding importance of the NZBORA and the rights it guarantees justifies any 
concerns about the effect that awarding public law damages may have on traditional, 
common law concepts of judicial immunity.134 Simply put, the duties created by the 
NZBORA’s adoption apply equally to all branches of government and override pre-
existing notions about the importance of insulating judicial processes from forms of 
collateral challenge.   
For the majority, however, Baigent’s Case and the reasoning underpinning that 
decision was not determinative: ‘the reality is that [Chapman] also turns on a policy 
judgment [in relation] to systemic public interest considerations, the most important of 
which is judicial independence’. 135  In other words, the need to ensure adequate 
remedies for NZBORA breaches is but one matter of social policy to be taken into 
account alongside other, equally important considerations. The majority held three 
such matters — ‘the desirability of achieving finality, promoting judicial independence 
and the availability of existing remedies for breach, including through the appellate 
process’ 136 — meant that monetary damages awards for judicial breaches of the 
NZBORA were neither necessary nor desirable. Permitting them ‘would be destructive 
of the administration of justice in New Zealand and ultimately judicial protection of 
human rights in our justice system’.137 Accordingly, in the words of the Chief Justice, 
the majority chose to create ‘a new immunity for the State, fashioned by reference to 
judicial immunity’ from the consequences of breaching the NZBORA.138 
The history of the remedy of damages for breaches of the NZBORA reflects the 
instrument’s uncertain place in New Zealand’s constitutional arrangements. The 
remedy came into existence through the strongest expression yet of the NZBORA’s 
inflationary potential. The Court of Appeal in Baigent’s Case crafted it out of little 
more than the general principle that the NZBORA rights possess such importance that 
131  See R v Taito [2003] UKPC 15, [2003] 3 NZLR 577. 
132  Chapman [2012] 1 NZLR 462, [8] (per Elias CJ). See also at [216] (per Anderson J). 
133  Ibid [52] (Elias CJ). 
134  Ibid [59]. 
135  Ibid [97] (McGrath and William Young JJ). See also at [211]-[215] (Gault J). 
136  Ibid [180] (McGrath and William Young JJ). 
137  Ibid [205]. 
138  Ibid [56] (Elias CJ). This immunity has since been extended to court registrars (see Siemer v 
Attorney General [2014] NZHC 3175, [127]-[131]) and to judicial breaches of the s 22 right not 
to be arbitrarily arrested or detained (see Thompson v Attorney-General [2016] NZSC 134).  
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some form of effective judicial response must be available to vindicate a breach. The 
Court also was prepared to engage in some quite inventive statutory interpretation to 
ensure that an existing immunity provision crafted by parliament did not preclude the 
remedy’s application to the case at hand. However, judicial application of the remedy 
in subsequent cases has been markedly more deflationary. Damages are only rarely 
considered necessary to vindicate a rights breach, are relatively modest in amount and 
most often do not exceed what a plaintiff can claim under other private law causes of 
action. Furthermore, by 2011 the apparently fundamental principle justifying the 
remedy’s invention in Baigent’s Case was no longer considered strong enough to 
underpin its application to rights breaches by the judicial branch. Instead, competing 
matters of social importance took priority over the NZBORA’s rights guarantees,139 
potentially leaving individuals whose rights are infringed by the judiciary without any 
effective remedy.  
C  Rights Consistent Statutory Interpretation 
As noted above,140 section 6 of the NZBORA contains the general direction that: 
‘Wherever an enactment can be given a meaning that is consistent with the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights, that meaning shall be preferred to any other 
meaning’. However, this statutory requirement follows two other provisions. Section 4 
states that ‘no court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before 
or after the commencement of this Bill of Rights)’ invalidate or refuse to apply that 
enactment’s provisions ‘by reason only that the provision is inconsistent with any 
provision of this Bill of Rights’. Consequently, courts must continue to give full effect 
to legislation that cannot be given a meaning consistent with the NZBORA’s various 
substantive rights guarantees. Section 5, which is subject to section 4, states that the 
rights in the NZBORA may be subject only to ‘such reasonable limits prescribed by 
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society’. Taken together, 
these three provisions (or, as they have been pejoratively termed, ‘unholy trinity’)141 
regulate the relationship between the NZBORA and other parliamentary enactments. 
The obvious question is just how they do so. In particular, two issues generated 
considerable confusion, which has not entirely dissipated today. First, how does 
section 5 fit into the process of statutory interpretation mandated by the NZBORA? 
Does it require the courts to independently consider the ‘justifiability’ of any limits 
that competing parliamentary enactments appear to impose on the NZBORA’s 
rights? 142  Second, how strong is the section 6 licence to repurpose competing 
parliamentary enactments in order to avoid inconsistency with the NZBORA’s rights? 
Or, to put the same question in a different way, how much does section 4 constrain the 
courts from intervening in a legislative choice they believe to be inconsistent with the 
NZBORA’s rights? As with the other possible remedial responses available to the 
courts, the judiciary’s answer to these matters has been strongly influenced by its 
views on the instrument’s basic purpose. 
Uncertainty over the role (if any) that section 5 was to play when interpreting 
competing enactments permeated early judicial decisions. In some cases, such as R v 
139  Varuhas, above n. 116 at 419 (‘… courts, under the umbrella of balancing approaches, have 
nearly completely subordinated interests in redress to countervailing public concerns’). 
140  See above, nn 27-28 and accompanying text.  
141  James Allan, ‘The Operative Provisions of the Bill of Rights: An Unholy Trinity’ (1995) 5 Bill 
of Rights Bulletin 79.  
142  Claudia Geiringer describes this question as lying ‘at the heart of [the methodological] 
instability’ she perceives as pervading the NZBORA; see Geiringer, What’s the Story?, above n 
12 at 159.  
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Phillips 143  and Re Bennett, 144  the courts considered that as only one plausible 
interpretation existed for the statutory wording in question, the NZBORA had no 
relevance at all. The courts simply applied that clear meaning (as required by section 
4) without further comment. Even in those cases where a section 5 analysis was 
referenced during the interpretative exercise, it was only in a cursory fashion.145 Most 
notably, the question of section 5’s role divided the Court of Appeal in the jointly 
decided cases of Ministry of Transport v Noort and Police v Curran.146 A minority 
considered that section 5 had no function when considering whether competing 
legislation ‘can’ be given a meaning under section 6 consistent with NZBORA rights 
(or, instead, an inconsistent meaning must be applied as per section 4).147 The majority, 
however, believed that section 5 should be applied prior to commencing the 
interpretation exercise under section 6, ‘as a mechanism to ensure recognition of the 
Act’s rights and freedoms to the fullest extent that is reasonable and practicable in a 
specific statutory context’.148  
Eventually, the courts came to adopt that latter, inflationary view of the 
NZBORA’s demands when considering parliament’s intended purpose for other 
parliamentary enactments. In Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review,149 a 
unanimous Court of Appeal indicated that the appropriate approach to interpreting 
legislation that prima facie limits a NZBORA right is to first consider whether the 
legislative constraint is ‘demonstrably justified’, as per section 5.150 Only if a court 
considers that the limit is not justified does it need to go on to consider if it ‘can’ adopt 
an alternative, rights consistent meaning (under section 6), or if it instead is required to 
apply the original, rights inconsistent meaning (under section 4).151 Consequently, the 
NZBORA was seen as obliging the judiciary to conduct an independent policy 
analysis152 of the parliament’s reasons for choosing to limit rights in order to decide 
whether it is necessary to engage in ‘rights friendly’153 interpretation of a statute. A 
majority in the Supreme Court subsequently endorsed this view of the NZBORA in 
Hansen v R,154 with three members of the bench approving an interpretative approach 
that requires the court to engage with a section 5 analysis. 155  Hanna Wilberg 
summarises the majority’s methodology as follows: 
 
first determin[e] the natural and intended meaning of the applicable statutory 
provision, and then ask[] whether that meaning is apparently inconsistent with 
a protected right; whether the limit on the right is justifiable in terms of s 5; 
and if so, whether another more rights-consistent meaning can reasonably be 
                                                
143  [1991] 3 NZLR 175 (CA). 
144  [1993] 2 HRNZ 358 (HC).  
145  See, eg, Reille v Police [1993] 1 NZLR 587, 591 (HC). 
146  [1992] 3 NZLR 260. 
147  Ibid 273 (Cooke P); at 295 (Gault J). 
148  Ibid 287 (Hardie Boys J). See also at 284 (Richardson J); at 297 (McKay J). 
149  [2000] 2 NZLR 9 (CA).  
150  Ibid [16]-[17] (Tipping J).  
151  Ibid. 
152  Using a methodology imported wholesale from Canadian case law; see R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 
103; R v Chaulk [1990] 3 SCR 1303, 1335-36; Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283-284; Moonen 
[2000] 2 NZLR 9, [18]; Hansen v R [2007] NZSC 7, [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [64], [103]-[104], [203]-
[204], [272]. See also Andrew Butler, ‘Limiting Rights’ (2002) 33 Victoria University of 
Wellington Law Review 537, 568-573. 
153  Andrew Geddis and Bridget Fenton, ‘‘Which is to be Master?’ – Rights-Friendly Statutory 
Interpretation in New Zealand and the United Kingdom’ (2008) 25 Arizona Journal of 
International and Comparative Law 733. 
154  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
155 Ibid [92] (Tipping J), at [57]–[60] (Blanchard J), at [192] (McGrath J).  
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found pursuant to s 6. If no more consistent meaning can be found, finally the 
natural meaning must prevail pursuant to s 4.156 
However, Elias CJ strongly dissented from this approach, arguing that: 
The sequence suggested, by which consideration of justification under section 
5 is a necessary step in determining whether an enactment is consistent with a 
right under Part 2 [of the NZBORA], would set up a soft form of judicial 
review of legislation which seems inconsistent with section 4 of the Act.157  
Her Honour instead preferred an interpretative approach mirroring the minority in 
Noort, 158  under which the courts do not interrogate the parliamentary reasons for 
imposing a limit on one of the NZBORA’s substantive rights.  
Despite the Chief Justice’s ongoing deflationary reservations, Hansen largely 
settles the question of section 5’s role in the statutory interpretation process.159 Before 
considering if they need to engage in rights-friendly statutory interpretation under 
section 6, courts must assess for themselves the justifications advanced for legislatively 
imposed limit on rights. On occasion, this leads them to reject claims of inconsistency 
between a statute’s ‘natural and intended’ meaning and the NZBORA, either through 
selecting a natural and intended meaning that avoids any potential inconsistencies with 
a guaranteed right,160 or accepting the reasons given for parliament’s chosen rights 
limit.161 On other occasions, however, the courts have found that that the natural and 
intended meaning of the words used in the statutory text impose unjustified limits on 
the rights in the NZBORA.162 The case of Hansen itself, for example, centred on a 
‘reverse onus’ provision contained in the Misuse of Drugs Act,163 which states that a 
person in possession of more than a specified amount of a prohibited drug shall, ‘until 
the contrary is proved’, be deemed to possess it for the purpose of supply. The natural 
and intended meaning of this provision, contended by the Crown, was that the accused 
faces a legal onus to show on the balance of probabilities that he or she did not possess 
the drugs for the purpose of supply.164 Such a reading prima facie limits an accused’s 
right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.165 A majority of the Supreme Court 
then concluded that this meaning was inconsistent with the NZBORA, as it imposed 
156  Hanna Wilberg, ‘Resisting the Siren Song of the Hansen Sequence: The State of Supreme Court 
Authority on the Sections 5 and 6 Conundrum’ (2015) 26 Public Law Review 39, 42 (hereafter 
Wilberg, ‘Resisting the Siren Song’).  
157  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [6]. See also at [15]-[19]. 
158  See above n 147. 
159  See Wilberg, Resisting the Siren Song, above n 156, 39-40. 
160  See, eg, R v Harrison; R v Turner [2016] NZCA 381. 
161  See, eg, Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [71]-[78] (Blanchard J); Television New Zealand Ltd v 
Solicitor-General [2008] NZCA 519; [2009] NZFLR 390, [67]-[74]; Commerce Commission v 
Air New Zealand Limited [2011] NZCA 64; [2011] 2 NZLR 194, [65]-[76]; Attorney General v 
Reid [2012] NZHC 2119; [2012] 3 NZLR 630, [37]; Mangawhai Ratepayers and Residents 
Association Incorporated v Kaipara District Council [2015] NZCA 612, affirmed [2016] NZSC 
48, [11]-[13]. 
162  See, eg, Hopkinson v Police [2004] 3 NZLR 704 (HC); Belcher v Chief Executive of the 
Department of Corrections [2007] 1 NZLR 507, [52] (CA); Re Application by AMM and KJO to 
adopt a child [2010] NZHC 977, [2010] NZFLR 629; Saddle Views Estate Limited v Dunedin 
City Council [2014] NZHC 2897, [106]-[111]; R v Eruera [2016] NZHC 532, [65], footnote 16. 
163  Evidence Act 1975 (NZ) s 6(6). 
164  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [4].  
165  NZBORA 1990 (NZ), s 25(c). 
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limits on the relevant right that could not be demonstrably justified as per section 5.166 
Consequently, the Court considered whether an alternative interpretation ‘can’ be 
given to the provision under section 6 after making its own independent finding that 
the legislature’s preferred policy approach denies the accused’s right in ways that fail 
close and careful analysis.  
It might be expected that having adopted something of an inflationary view of the 
NZBORA’s purpose in relation to section 5, the courts likewise would regard the 
interpretative direction in section 6 as mandating an expansive judicial role in seeking 
to cure any unjustified rights infringements contained in competing legislation. Indeed, 
some early obiter comments hinted at just such an approach.167 However, other judicial 
views rejected the notion that the NZBORA demanded any particular change to 
previous practice, instead arguing that section 6’s effect ‘probably go[es] little further 
than the common law presumption of statutory interpretation that where possible 
statutes are not to be interpreted as abrogating common law rights of citizens’.168 
While there has been some deviation in judicial practice, on the whole it is the latter, 
deflationary view of the provision’s intended effect that has prevailed. The touchstone 
for New Zealand courts continues to be parliament’s sovereign right to legislate as it 
sees fit, with judges reluctant to be seen to be imposing their value-judgments in place 
of those preferred by democratically elected representatives. For example, in Quilter v 
Attorney-General169 the Court of Appeal was asked to declare that the definition of 
‘marriage’ in the Marriage Act,170 being the ‘union of 2 people’, permitted same-sex 
couples to marry. The plaintiffs argued that the existing understanding of the statutory 
language, which restricted the practice to a man and a woman, unjustifiably breached 
the NZBORA’s section 19 right to freedom from discrimination. They then invited the 
Court to use section 6 to read the provision in a rights-consistent fashion as including 
any two people of any gender. Whilst the five members of the Court divided on 
whether the legislation’s existing application even had a discriminatory effect, much 
less whether any such effect was justified,171 all were united in their view that the 
meaning sought for the statutory words simply was not available. Justice Tipping held 
that ‘the Bill of Rights must be given its full effect in the necessary process of 
interpretation, but it may not be used as a concealed legislative tool’.172 Similarly, 
Gault J was of the opinion that:  
The Marriage Act is clear and to give it such different meaning would not be 
to undertake interpretation but to assume the role of lawmaker which is for 
Parliament. That is particularly so in an area where the law reflects social 
values and policy.173  
166 Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [43]-[44] (Elias CJ); [148] (Tipping J); [233]-[234] (McGrath J); 
[281] (Anderson J).
167  See Flickinger v Crown Colony of Hong Kong [1991] 1 NZLR 439, 440 (CA); Noort [1992] 3 
NZLR 260, 272; Paul Rishworth, ‘The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: The First Fifteen 
Months’ in Essays on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (Legal Research Foundation, 
1992), 24. 
168  Baigent’s Case [1993] 3 NZLR 667, 712 (Gault J). 
169  [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). 
170 Marriage Act 1955 (NZ), s 2. Parliament subsequently amended this provision by the Marriage 
(Definition of Marriage) Amendment Act 2013 (NZ) s 5 to read ‘the union of 2 people, 
regardless of their sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity’ (emphasis ours). 
171  See Grant Huscroft, ‘Discrimination, Dignity and the Limits of Equality’ (2000) 9(4) Otago Law 
Review 697, 699-702. 
172  Quilter [1998] 1 NZLR 523, 572. 
173  Ibid 526. 
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Even Thomas J, who regarded the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage as an 
unjustifiable breach of their NZBORA rights, nevertheless concluded that it was not 
open to the Court to adopt a meaning for the Marriage Act so clearly contrary to 
parliament’s intent.174  
The Supreme Court subsequently underlined section 6’s restrained role in 
remedying unjustifiable statutory limits on NZBORA rights. As earlier noted,175 the 
Court in Hansen assessed the justifiability of parliament’s requirement that an accused 
prove, on the balance of probabilities, he or she did not possess drugs for the purpose 
of supply. A majority then concluded that applying the reverse onus provision in this 
manner was an unjustified limit on the accused’s right to be presumed innocent. 
Nonetheless, the Court unanimously held this to be the only available interpretation of 
the statutory wording. 176  As expressed by McGrath J: ‘[T]he basic principle of 
interpretation [is] that the text is the primary reference in ascertaining meaning and 
there is no authority to adopt meanings which go beyond those which the language 
being interpreted will bear’.177  Consequently, in the absence of ambiguity or other 
indication from the statutory language, there is no justification for giving a legislative 
provision an artificial and unintended (albeit more rights-consistent) meaning.178 Not 
only is NZBORA, section 6 interpretation glossed with a general criterion of 
‘reasonableness’, 179  but the limits of interpretive reasonableness extend only to 
meanings that are ‘genuinely open in light of both [the statutory] text and its 
purpose’.180 
Section 6’s constrained role in New Zealand’s adjudicative process recently has 
led courts to refuse to read statutes to permit contentious social practices such as 
prisoner voting181 and physician-assisted dying, 182 on the basis that such matters ought 
to remain parliament’s sole preserve. Such a view of the NZBORA as authorising only 
minimal rights-friendly interpretative intervention in the legislature’s policy choices 
stands in notable contrast to the ‘adventurous’ 183  (or, more pejoratively, 
‘aggressive’184) practices of the United Kingdom courts under its very similar Human 
                                                
174  Ibid 541. 
175  See above n 166 and accompanying text. 
176  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [39] (Elias CJ); at [56] (Blanchard J); at [165] (Tipping J); at [256] 
(McGrath J); at [290] (Anderson J). 
177  Ibid [237]. See also at [25] (Elias CJ); at [61] (Blanchard J); at [88]–[94] (Tipping J); at [289]–
[290] (Anderson J). 
178  See, eg, ibid [61] (Blanchard J) (claiming that the use of s 6 is confined to meanings that are 
‘available on the language of the text being interpreted’; that the text remains the ‘primary 
reference in ascertaining meaning’; and that there is no authority to go beyond meanings that 
‘the language being interpreted will bear’).  
179  Synonyms for which are ‘intellectually defensible’, ‘tenable’ or ‘viable’. See ibid [156], [158], 
[232].  
180  Ibid [61] (Blanchard J). 
181  Taylor v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 2225, [2015] NZAR 705, [26]-[31]. See also Taylor v 
Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 355, [108] (‘In my opinion, s 6 of NZBORA does not justify a 
forced and fallacious interpretation of the Electoral Act. That would elevate NZBORA to being a 
statute superior to all other statutes’). 
182  Seales v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1239, [13] (‘The [interpretations] sought by Ms Seales 
invite me to change the effect of the offence provisions of the Crimes Act. The changes to the 
law sought by Ms Seales can only be made by Parliament’). 
183  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [156] (Tipping J). 
184  Hanna Wilberg, ‘The Bill of Rights and Other Enactments’ [2007] New Zealand Law Journal 
112, 115. 
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Rights Act. 185  However, members of New Zealand’s Supreme Court expressly 
disavowed following that lead on the basis that: 
The constitutional debate which preceded the rejection of the proposal to give 
the Bill of Rights the status of supreme law also appears to be unique to New 
Zealand. It is an important contextual feature which New Zealand judges must 
bear in mind when considering how the courts of overseas jurisdictions with 
similarly structured legislation, in particular those of England and Wales, 
have seen their authority to look for meanings other than the natural meaning 
of a statutory provision, which potentially affect protected rights.186 
In response to this deflationary understanding of what the NZBORA was 
intended to achieve, some argue that the judiciary’s cautious approach to section 6 (as 
exemplified in Hansen) is too constrained.187 By refusing to depart from what is seen 
to be parliament’s clear intended purpose for a statutory provision, even where that 
purpose is judged to unjustifiably breach rights, the courts fail to properly accord those 
rights their true value.188 Instead, if section 6 is to have any function in protecting 
individual rights, it ‘may on occasion entitle the courts to adopt constructions [of 
legislative text] that are at odds with statutory purpose’.189 
Consistent with this article’s overall thesis that no hegemonic, consistently 
applied view of the NZBORA’s purpose has yet emerged, there are instances where 
judicial reasoning also reflects this more inflationary understanding. For example, 
several members of the Court of Appeal indicated (albeit in obiter comments) that 
section 6 justified adopting a quite inventive understanding of the relationship between 
various legislative amendments to avoid the potential application of retrospective 
criminal penalties in two particular cases.190  Courts also have relied on section 6 to 
adopt meanings for statutory provisions that allow political protestors to burn flags,191 
unmarried men and women to jointly adopt children, 192  and satirical singers to 
broadcast criticisms of political figures.193  Prior to deciding Hansen, the Supreme 
Court unanimously deployed section 6 to interpret the Immigration Act as preventing 
government ministers from deporting refugees deemed to be a security threat where 
‘there are substantial grounds for believing that, as a result of the deportation, the 
person would be in danger of being arbitrarily deprived of life or of being subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. 194  And in a 
judgment delivered just three months after Hansen, a majority of the Court in Brooker 
185 Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), c. 42. See also John Burrows, ‘Statutory Interpretation New Style’ 
[2005] New Zealand Law Journal 130, 156-58; Geddis & Fenton, above  n 153, 754-60. 
186  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [239] (McGrath J); see also at [158] (Tipping J). 
187  See, eg, Claudia Geiringer, ‘The Principle of Legality and the Bill of Rights Act: A Critical 
Examination of R v Hansen’ (2008) 6 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 59
(hereafter Geiringer, ‘Principle of Legality’); Kris Gledhill, ‘The Interpretative Obligation: The 
Duty to Do What is Possible’ [2008] New Zealand Law Review 283. 
188  Gledhill, above n 187, 332. 
189  Geiringer, Principle of Legality, above n 187 at 89. 
190  R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 (CA); R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA).  
191  Hopkinson [2004] 3 NZLR 704. 
192  Re Application by AMM and KJO to Adopt a Child [2010] NZHC 977; [2010] NZFLR 629, [72] 
(expressing ‘the view that our task is to alleviate the discrimination now to the extent possible’). 
But see Adoption Action Incorporated v Attorney-General [2016] NZHRRT 9, [158] (Human 
Rights Review Tribunal refusing to extend the ruling to cover individuals in civil unions, or 
same sex couples living in de facto arrangements, as ‘the Tribunal would pass from an 
aggressive application of section 6 to legislating’). 
193  Electoral Commission v Watson [2016] NZCA 512. 
194  Attorney-General v Zaoui [2005] NZSC 38; [2005] 1 NZLR 577, [90]-[93]. 
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v Police 195  was prepared to upend some twenty-five years worth of settled 
jurisprudence by applying a far narrower meaning to the Summary Offences Act 
prohibition on public ‘disorderly behaviour’ so as to protect the NZBORA’s guarantee 
of freedom of expression.196  
Importantly, however, in both Brooker and the Court’s later revisiting of the issue 
in R v Morse,197 the members of the Court did not purport to rely upon section 6 to 
justify their interpretative shift. Instead, 
when it comes to deciding what kinds of behaviour [the Summary Offences 
Act] proscribes, the Court simply says that the relevant offence (read correctly 
in its statutory context) requires that behaviour result in some measure of 
disruption to ‘public order’. And the important point for present purposes is 
that this reading is presented as the correct one — the one that Parliament 
intended when passing the statute — without overt reliance on the 
interpretative command in s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act. Certainly, this reading 
may be consistent with s 6 as being one that is more protective of the rights in 
the Bill of Rights Act. But it is not required or justified by s 6.198  
It is, perhaps, revelatory that the Supreme Court did not feel comfortable claiming that 
its revision of previously settled law was mandated by the NZBORA, instead 
portraying its interpretative task as involving more orthodox, traditional techniques for 
reading a statute.199  
This reluctance to rely overtly upon section 6 as justification for adopting novel 
meanings for statutes perhaps reflects Paul Rishworth’s (somewhat cryptic) general 
summary of the current approach to rights-friendly interpretation under the NZBORA:  
I think s[ection] 6 is best regarded as Parliament’s message to assist courts in 
determining the meaning of its enactments and does not contemplate a level 
of interpretive impact that is different from the conventional approach [to 
reading statutes]. On the other hand, the idea of seeking rights-consistency 
may enliven the conventional approach, and generate interpretive possibilities 
that would otherwise not be appreciated. 200 
It is tempting to extrapolate from Rishworth’s statement and apply it to the 
NZBORA as a whole: the instrument was not meant to make much of a difference to 
how the courts function, except in the situations that it should. However, in relation to 
the specific matter at hand — the use of the NZBORA to make competing legislation 
rights consistent — the combination of judicial consideration of section 5 with only a 
limited role for section 6 raises a final issue for resolution. Adopting this alternating 
inflationary/deflationary methodological approach makes it likely that in at least some, 
if not many, cases a court will reach the end of the interpretative process having found 
that the natural and intended meaning of the statutory wording imposes (in its opinion) 
an unjustified limit on rights, but that no other interpretation can be given to it. At this 
point section 4 of the NZBORA mandates that the court must apply the original, 
195  [2007] NZSC 30, [2007] 3 NZLR 91. 
196  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) s 14. 
197  [2011] NZSC 45, [2012] 2 NZLR 1. 
198  Andrew Geddis, ‘Dissent, The Bill of Rights Act and the Supreme Court’ (2011) 11 New 
Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 55, 72 (emphasis in the original) (internal 
citations omitted). 
199  Ibid 70-73. See also R v Harrison; R v Turner [2016] NZCA 381, [78]-[120]; Electoral 
Commission v Watson [2016] NZCA 512, [88]-[99]. 
200  Paul Rishworth, ‘Human Rights’ [2012] New Zealand Law Review 321, 330-331. 
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unjustifiable meaning to the case at hand. That outcome was accepted in Hansen and 
no New Zealand court ever has sought to do otherwise. However, what is not resolved 
is whether there is any other action that a court may take in order to mark the resultant 
rights-inconsistency. That issue poses the final remedial question for the courts under 
the NZBORA. 
D  Declarations of Inconsistency 
Where the executive branch — or other person or body exercising a public 
function, power or duty — acts in a way that unjustifiably limits NZBORA rights, and 
that limiting action is not authorised by a parliamentary enactment, then the traditional 
declaratory remedy in administrative law is at a court’s disposal.201  That is to say, a 
court may declare the action to be unlawful because of its inconsistency with the 
NZBORA (a parliamentary enactment), thereby formally marking government 
wrongdoing and preventing repetition of the conduct. The court also may, as discussed 
above, 202  award public law damages under the NZBORA if thought necessary to 
vindicate the rights breach. However, in circumstances where parliament has positively 
authorised through legislation actions that unjustifiably limit rights, and the courts 
cannot interpret that legislation in a rights friendly manner, 203  then the courts are 
required by section 4 to apply the statutory wording as written. Doing so takes the 
traditional administrative law declaratory remedy off the table, as there is, ipso facto, 
no unlawfulness to declare. Rather, the statutory authorisation makes the unjustified 
limit lawful, because parliament has said that the limit is lawful and parliament 
remains the nation’s highest lawmaker. Are the courts then left without any remedial 
options in such circumstances? 
Shortly after the NZBORA first entered into force, suggestions were made that 
where section 4 requires a court to apply a statute in a rights-inconsistent fashion, it 
nevertheless could mark that fact with a formal ‘declaration of inconsistency’. 204 
Section 4 prevents a declaration affecting the validity or application of the statutory 
provision, meaning it would function purely as a public mark of judicial 
disapprobation regarding the legislation’s consequences. While not positively 
sanctioned by the NZBORA (in comparison with the United Kingdom,205 Victoria206 or 
Australian Capital Territory 207 ), the remedy could be derived from the rights 
instrument’s very nature and purpose. In particular, as noted in the previous section, 
the inclusion of section 5 has come to be seen to require that the courts independently 
assess the rights impact of parliamentary legislation when interpreting statutes that 
impose a prima facie limit on rights.208 Although any rights-limiting enactment that 
cannot be interpreted under section 6 in a way that meets the ‘demonstrably justified’ 
test must still be applied, the NZBORA is silent as to what else can be done with 
judicial conclusions reached during the evaluative exercise. In 2000, Tipping J wrote 
for a five-member Court of Appeal that:  
201  Declaratory Judgments Act 1908 (NZ) s 3; Judicature Amendment Act 1972 (NZ) s 4(1). 
202  See above at part 4(b). 
203  See above at part 4(c). 
204  F M Brookfield, ‘Constitutional Law’ [1992] New Zealand Recent Law 231, 239; Temese v 
Police, 9 CRNZ 425, 427 (1992) (CA, Cooke P). 
205  Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42, s 4. 
206  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) s 36.  
207  Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 32.  
208  See above n 159. See also Paul Rishworth, ‘The Inevitability of Judicial Review under 
“Interpretive” Bills of Rights: Canada’s Legacy to New Zealand and Commonwealth 
Constitutionalism?’ in G Huscroft and I Brodie (eds), Constitutionalism in the Charter Era 
(LexisNexis, 2004) 233.  
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In the light of the presence of section 5 in the Bill of Rights, New Zealand 
society as a whole can rightly expect that on appropriate occasions the Courts 
will indicate whether a particular legislative provision is or is not justified 
thereunder.209  
Justice Thomas, speaking for himself, already had gone further by proclaiming that ‘it 
would be a serious error not to proclaim a violation [of the NZBORA] if and when a 
violation is found to exist in the law’;210 while in a later case he delivered a minority 
decision in which he argued for issuing a declaration of inconsistency in the case 
before the court.211 
However, despite these inflationary judicial statements as to the NZBORA’s 
fundamental constitutional importance and the appropriate judicial role under it, no 
formal declarations of inconsistency were actually issued in the NZBORA’s first 
twenty-five years. Indeed, it appeared as though New Zealand’s judges were 
determined to find reasons to avoid having to do so:  
[a]lthough [the courts] continue to leave open the ultimate question as to
whether there is such a jurisdiction [to issue a declaration], [they] place
significant hedges around its scope and the circumstances in which it might be
exercised, the most significant being its restriction to civil proceedings. More
generally, the tenor of this body of case law suggests that, even if a residual
jurisdiction to make declarations of inconsistency does exist, it will be
exercised only rarely. 212
In addition to narrowing the range of cases where a declaration of inconsistency 
is a theoretically possible remedy, the courts also developed a novel way of 
‘indicating’ legislative inconsistency with the NZBORA without making a formal 
declaration. Recall that in Hansen213 a majority of the Supreme Court concluded that 
the Misuse of Drugs Act’s natural and intended meaning unjustifiably limited the 
NZBORA guaranteed right to be presumed innocent, but it nevertheless applied that 
meaning under section 4 because no other ‘reasonable’ interpretation was available. 
Rather than then formally declaring the Misuse of Drugs Act to be inconsistent with 
the NZBORA, the Hansen Court instead preferred to allow its reasoning to speak for 
itself, confident that: 
there will be a reappraisal of the objectives of the particular measure, and of 
the means by which they were implemented in the legislation, in light of the 
finding of inconsistency with these fundamental rights and freedoms 
209  Moonen [2000] 2 NZLR 9, [20] (Tipping J). 
210  Quilter [1998] 1 NZLR 523, 554 (Thomas J). 
211  Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 [86]-[107] (Thomas J). 
212  Claudia Geiringer, ‘On a Road to Nowhere: Implied Declarations of Inconsistency and the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act’ (2009) 40 Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 613, 623. 
See also Taunoa v Attorney-General [2006] NZSC 95,  [8]; R v Exley [2007] NZCA 393, [20]; 
Belcher v The Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections [2007] NZCA 174, [15]-[17], 
affirmed [2007] NZSC 54; McDonnell v Chief Executive of the Department of Corrections 
(2009) 8 HRNZ 770, [123] (CA); Boscawen v Attorney-General [2009] NZCA 12 (CA), [2009] 
2 NZLR 229, [55]-[56]. 
213  [2007] 3 NZLR 1. 
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concerning which there is general consensus in New Zealand society and 
there are international obligations to affirm.214 
This approach of showing the nature of a legislative inconsistency sotto voce rather 
than explicitly declaring its existence by way of a formal judicial order allowed the 
Court to avoid having to construct a basis for such a declaratory remedy not explicitly 
provided for in the NZBORA.   
For despite the judiciary’s inflationary claims regarding the necessary 
implications of conducting a section 5 analysis during the interpretative exercise, the 
Crown consistently has denied the existence of such a declaratory remedy. 215 
Opposition is couched in explicitly deflationary terms, arguing that such a 
development would involve ‘bring[ing] the Court into conflict with Parliament 
contrary to the fundamental principle of comity’; and ‘call[ing] into question a 
proceeding in Parliament in breach of article 9 of the Bill of Rights [1688] in a matter 
clearly beyond that contemplated by the House via the enactment of s[ection] 5 of 
NZBORA’.216 Although parliament may have intended the NZBORA to somewhat 
empower judicial review of executive branch actions, it did not mean to authorise any 
form of external fetter upon its own activities. Parliament intended to remain 
sovereign, in that no outside body may purport to judge how it ought to legislate. In the 
face of such vigorous opposition to an expanded judicial role, New Zealand’s courts 
appeared anxious not to press the matter by actually exercising any theoretical 
declaratory jurisdiction. 
In 2015, however, the High Court finally overcame such hesitation and issued the 
first declaration of inconsistency under the NZBORA. The spur for this development 
occurred in 2010, when New Zealand’s Parliament legislated to remove all sentenced 
prisoners’ right to enrol to vote whilst they remained behind bars.217 Upon the Bill’s 
introduction into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General attached a notice 
under section 7 of the NZBORA stating his view that it limited the right to vote 
guaranteed by section 12(a) of the NZBORA in a way that could not be demonstrably 
justified under section 5.218 In particular, 
[t]he disenfranchising provisions of this Bill will depend entirely on the date
of sentencing, which bears no relationship either to the objective of the Bill or
214  Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, [254] (McGrath J). This confidence was somewhat misplaced, as not 
only does the inconsistent legislative provision remain in place today, but also parliament 
subsequently twice extended its application to new substances. See  Janet Hiebert & James 
Kelly, Parliamentary Bills of Rights: The Experiences of New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
(Cambridge University Press, 2015) 128-159. 
215  See, eg, Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents Association v Kaipara District Council (No 3) 
[2014] NZHC 1147, [2014] 3 NZLR 85, [34], affirmed Mangawhai Ratepayers’ and Residents 
Association v Kaipara District Council [2015] NZCA 612; Taylor v Attorney-General [2014] 
NZHC 1630; Harrison v R; Turner v R [2016] NZCA 381, [119]. 
216  Taylor [2014] NZHC 1630, [40]–[41]. 
217  Electoral Act 1993 (NZ) s 80(1)(d). This provision originally disqualified from enrolling to vote 
any prisoner who was serving a sentence of three or more years. 
218  Section 7 of the NZBORA reads as follows: 
7  Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be inconsistent with 
Bill of Rights 
Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General 
shall, — 
(a) in the case of a Government Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or
(b) in any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill,—
bring to the attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears
to be inconsistent with any of the rights and freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights.
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to the conduct of the prisoners whose voting rights are taken away. The 
irrational effects of the Bill also cause it to be disproportionate to its 
objective.219 
Despite this warning, the Bill passed through the legislative process with only 
minimal debate; for instance, the majority select committee report recommending the 
measure’s passage into law did not even mention the Attorney-General’s notice and 
provided no reasons to justify its conclusion.220 Following the Bill’s passage on a 63-
58 party-line vote, some 3000 additional individuals became ineligible to vote at the 
2011 and subsequent elections. 
However, a group of prisoners then sought to have the High Court declare this 
ban inconsistent with the NZBORA. Not only was this the only available remedy — 
the legislative provision only could be interpreted to mean that all sentenced prisoners 
may not vote whilst they remain behind bars221 — but the substance of the prisoners’ 
claim also provided compelling grounds for issuing a declaration. No argument arose 
as to the NZBORA consistency of banning all prisoners from voting. The Attorney-
General had certified the measure as being inconsistent and the Crown did not contest 
that conclusion following its passage into law. 222  The right involved was very 
important and the limitation extensive in nature. Furthermore, the means by which 
Parliament imposed the limit did not inspire confidence that the legislation’s rights-
consequences had been carefully and thoughtfully addressed. While it is quite within 
Parliament’s capacity to engage in such debates, that manifestly was not the case in 
New Zealand.223 
The prisoners’ claim for declaratory relief thus provided an ideal opportunity to 
adopt an inflationary view of the NZBORA and the role of the courts under it as 
defenders of individual rights. An initial attempt to strike out the case, on the basis 
there is no jurisdiction to provide the sought after remedy, failed as ‘it is now 
recognised that it is no longer correct to say that Parliament’s freedom to legislate 
admits of no qualification whatever’.224 In his subsequent substantive ruling, Heath J 
not only echoed this finding that the High Court has jurisdiction to provide such 
declaratory relief but also exercised his discretion to grant it. 225  On the jurisdictional 
point, Heath J extrapolated from the Court of Appeal’s inflationary approach to the 
NZBORA in Baigent’s Case: 
[t]he general principle is that where there has been a breach of the [NZBORA]
there is a need for a Court to fashion public law remedies to respond to the
wrong inherent in any breach of a fundamental right. Should the position be
any different in respect of the legislative branch of Government? In my view,
the answer is ‘no’.226
219  Hon Chris Finlayson, Report of the Attorney-General under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 on the Electoral (Disqualification of Convicted Prisoners) Amendment Bill, [15] (2010), 
available at <https://www.parliament.nz/resource/en-NZ/49DBHOH_PAP19503_1/ 
ac3708f32f29166772800eb9f4f694b25324e7ee>.  
220  Andrew Geddis, ‘Prisoner Voting and Rights Deliberation: How New Zealand’s Parliament 
Failed’ [2011] New Zealand Law Review 443, 463-464 (hereafter Geddis, Prisoner Voting). 
221  Taylor v Attorney-General [2014] NZHC 2225, [26]–[31]. See also Taylor v Key [2015] NZHC 
722, [72]–[78].  
222  Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706, [32]. 
223  See Geddis, Prisoner Voting, above n 220 at 462-467; Hiebert & Kelly, above n 214, 159-170. 
224  Taylor [2014] NZHC 1630, [73]. 
225  Taylor v Attorney-General [2015] NZHC 1706. 
226  Taylor [2015] NZHC 1706, [61]. 
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Having accepted that the declaratory remedy was available in theory, Heath J 
then turned to consider whether it ought to be provided in the immediate case. While 
there is no right to obtain a declaration whenever a court concludes that legislation is 
inconsistent with the NZBORA,227 Heath J noted that ‘[t]he authorities emphasise the 
desirability of the Court speaking out to identify cases in which particular legislation is 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights’.228 Justice Heath did not consider the Attorney-
General’s earlier notification of the proposed legislation’s inconsistency with the 
NZBORA a reason to be ‘hesitant’ when issuing a declaration.229 He instead saw a 
judicial declaration of inconsistency as different in nature and addressed to a quite 
different audience: ‘When reporting under s 7, the Attorney’s responsibility is to 
Parliament. When determining questions of public law, this Court’s responsibility is to 
all New Zealanders’.230 Therefore, respect for the principle of comity between the 
legislative and judicial branches should not dissuade the Court from issuing a 
declaration, as it is not an attempt to intervene in or directly influence any existing 
parliamentary proceeding.231  
As a declaration was an available remedy and nothing prevented Heath J from 
exercising his discretion to issue one, he did so. The right at issue was so important and 
the limit so severe that the occasion warranted providing relief even in the absence of 
any live controversy between the parties; ‘if a declaration were not made in this case, it 
is difficult to conceive of one in which it would’. 232 By issuing this declaration, the 
Court then intentionally sent a message to the New Zealand public regarding the nature 
of the law that governs them.233 As far as Heath J was concerned, ‘[a]ny political 
consequences of my decision can be debated in the court of public opinion, or in 
Parliament’.234 This conclusion then threw the issue back over to the political branches 
of government. Would they share in the Court’s inflated vision of the NZBORA and 
treat the declaration of inconsistency as a prompt to at least seriously rethink the issue 
of prisoner voting in light of this judicial finding that fundamental rights have been 
unjustifiably limited? Or, alternatively, would they adopt a deflationary view of the 
NZBORA by treating the issuance of a declaration as a non-event, given that there is 
no formal legal requirement to abide by it (or, indeed, respond to it in any way 
whatsoever)? 
Initial responses support the latter view. The Crown apparently does not even 
accept the High Court’s finding that declarations of inconsistency are an available 
remedial option, as it immediately chose to contest the decision on that point before the 
Court of Appeal. The Minister of Justice also has indicated that her Government ‘has 
no current plans to introduce legislation allowing prisoners to vote’235 in the wake of 
the High Court’s ruling. And when Parliament’s Justice and Electoral Committee was 
invited to consider the issue as a part of its regular post-election review of processes 
and practices, it concluded: 
227  Ibid [76]. 
228  Ibid [67] (emphasis ours). 
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231  Ibid [69]. 
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235  Letter from Amy Adams (New Zealand Minister of Justice) to Marion Sanson (NZ Centre for 








Some of us consider that voting rights should be reinstated for prisoners 
serving a custodial sentence of three years or less, as was the case previously. 
We also note the recent High Court declaration that current prisoner voting 
restrictions are inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
Some of us also argue that the prohibition on prisoner voting hinders 
rehabilitation and disproportionately affects Maori. Having considered this 
issue, the majority of the committee recommends that the status quo should be 
maintained.236  
 
Although this report engages to some extent with the High Court’s views, the 
governing majority clearly did not consider these weighty enough to overcome its 
existing policy preferences.  
Two somewhat interconnected reasons may explain just why that is the case. The 
first lies in the nature of the substantive law in question. Although the issuance of the 
declaration of inconsistency generated a measure of media attention, it provoked little-
to-no public concern. Prisoners are not a social group that attracts much sympathy in 
New Zealand’s current political climate. Thus, while Heath J’s judgment may have 
been intended to convey a message to the public about the nature of a law made in 
their name, the public did not react in a manner that placed any particular pressure on 
the political branches of government to amend it. The second reason for the political 
branches’ seeming lack of concern regarding the declared inconsistency is that it holds 
a different constitutional vision as to what the NZBORA is intended to accomplish. 
Tom Hickman refers to: 
 
the latent ambiguity in a declaration of incompatibility model as to what 
model of constitutionalism it is intended to reflect. This gives rise to very 
practical problems about what the response of government and Parliament 
should be. … Of course this ambiguity is part of the ‘fudge’ of the declaration 
of incompatibility which makes it attractive to people with very different 
constitutional visions. … But … very quickly these differences come to the 
fore and the fudge looks less like a sound compromise and more like a focal 
point for the exacerbation of underlying constitutional tensions.237 
 
Simply put, by issuing declarations of inconsistency the judicial branch is using 
the NZBORA as a vehicle to explicitly critique parliamentary legislation that it 
believes fails to show adequate concern for individual rights, reflecting a constitutional 
assumption that the rights instrument should operate as a functional restraint on 
legislative power. The political branches, on the other hand, view the NZBORA as 
something to consider when legislating, but ultimately it is for them to determine the 
appropriate limits on rights irrespective of what that legislation says (or, rather, what 
the courts may say that legislation says).  
 
 
V   WHAT LESSONS FOR QUEENSLAND? 
 
New Zealand’s experience with its statutory rights instrument provides one clear 
lesson for Queensland: despite valiant attempts by both supporters and detractors to 
claim otherwise, the actual effect of such instruments is somewhat unpredictable. In 
                                                
236  Justice and Electoral Committee Inquiry into the 2014 General Election: Report of the Justice 
and Electoral Committee (April 2016) 28.  
237  Tom Hickman, ‘Bill of Rights Reform and the Case for Going Beyond the Declaration of 
Incompatibility Model’ [2015] New Zealand Law Review 35, 69. 
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our view, however, the explanation for such unpredictability — and the uncertainty 
that it leads to — is similarly clear. The availability of two alternative understandings 
of the constitutional place and purpose of such instruments means their effect will vary 
according to which understanding is adopted. An inflationary account of statutory 
rights instruments views them as constitutional cornerstones, intended to impose 
significant restraints on all branches of government, and encouraging innovative 
judicial action in developing those restraints. Alternatively, a deflationary account 
views such instruments as essentially declaratory measures: restatements of existing 
common law principles that are enforceable through orthodox mechanisms and 
requiring no further judicial innovation.  The NZBORA was and is perhaps particularly 
susceptible to these competing understandings. Its contested origin story involves the 
legislative equivalent of stalemate between those who desired an entrenched higher-
law rights instrument and those who wished for no rights instrument at all; its inherent 
vagueness and ambiguity provided the NZBORA with the capacity to effect whichever 
constitutional vision was projected onto it. 
In its twenty-seven-year history, the branch of government tasked with 
determining the constitutional significance of the NZBORA has vacillated between 
these inflationary and deflationary approaches. That vacillation is most obviously 
reflected by the development of the remedies available to those who have had their 
rights under the instrument breached. Initial judicial enthusiasm for the availability of 
monetary damages and criminal justice remedies reflected an inflationary impulse, but 
the later tempering of the strength and availability of those remedies provide evidence 
of a more deflationary turn. In contrast, an initial milquetoast approach to interpreting 
other primary legislation consistently with the NZBORA gave way to a more 
inflationary conception, complicated sometimes by the judicial appetite to avoid using 
the NZBORA altogether. Debate and doubt over the jurisdiction to award declarations 
of inconsistency was a product of a deflationary account, but nevertheless the first 
declaration of inconsistency was issued in 2015. The deafening silence from the 
legislature in response to this hitherto theoretical remedy is either the product of the 
deflationary account or the particular political antipathy toward the issue it dealt with: 
the suffrage of prisoners. Therefore, we believe we have demonstrated how both the 
development and the application of remedies for breaches of the NZBORA are affected 
fundamentally by changing judicial views of what the instrument ought to do. 
Accordingly, our account has shown that New Zealand’s experience provides 
evidence for both supporters and detractors in the debate over whether Queensland 
should adopt an equivalent instrument. It is clear that such instruments are sufficiently 
flexible to allow the judiciary to develop different remedial approaches and the nature 
of such developments is not easily predictable. Such an experience may give detractors 
cheer: the effect of rights instruments is not a known quantity, and thus should warrant 
caution before adopting one. However, in New Zealand that flexibility has not led to 
the inflationary account achieving a knockout victory over the deflationary account. 
Supporters of statutory rights instruments may thus counter detractors’ concerns by 
pointing to the fact that the New Zealand judiciary has not consistently ratcheted up the 
strength of the NZBORA’s application over time; it has not surreptitiously turned 
Clark Kent into Superman.238 Instead, application of the NZBORA has been less linear 
and more vacillating than such accounts may suggest. Accordingly, unless 
Queensland’s judicial bench is a homogenous group with entirely lockstep views on 
the appropriate constitutional significance of statutory rights instruments, the New 
Zealand experience shows that the only certainty is that some judicial innovation under 
such instruments will occur, but just how much and to what ends is deeply uncertain. 
238  James Allan, ‘Turning Clark Kent into Superman: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990’ 
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